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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Believing that learning and memory are best characterized as under 
stimulus control, traditional experimentation on memory processes has 
assumed that the systematic manipulation of materials and tasks would 
lead to a theory of memory adequate both within and outside the labora-
tory (Jenkins, 1974a, 1974b). 
However, research has gradually·delineated a role in memory for 
processes·which are not directly under the control of the external 
stimulus. For example, stimulus selection has been found to occur during 
paired-associate (PA) learning (Underwood, Ham, & Ekstrand, 1962) and 
subjective organization during free recall (Tulving, 1962). Likewise, 
the negative results of experimentation on the interference theory of 
forgetting in the context of extraexperimental sources of interference 
have generated much research on the hypothesized operation of subjective 
performance variables such as recoding, differentiation, and the "se-
lector mechanism" (Postman, 1963). Such data and theory thus support 
the hypothesis that learning and memory are dete~ed by the interaction 
of stimulus- and subject-controlled processes. 
A subject-controlled process which has been given minimal.atten-
tion in psychological research has been the human memory system's self-
knowledge (Tulving & Madigan, 1970). A particular kind of_memorial 
self-knowledge which must be acquired for general competence outside the 
laboratory is the capacity to determine when study has been sufficient 
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to allow later retention. The basis of such self-knowledge would seem 
to be an ability to estimate the memorial status of presently studied 
material. 
An experiment by Bugelski and Rickwood {1963) indicates the 
presence of such a skill in the laboratory. Subjects in this study were 
allowed to self-pace their study of nonsense syllable paired-associates 
to a criterion of two successive correct repetitions of each response 
term. The mean total response exposure time per item for these subjects 
did not significantly differ from that required by subjects who learned 
the items to the same criterion under various experimenter-paced presen-
tation rates {Bugelski, 1962). It would seem that the subjects were 
rather adept at judging when learning was sufficient to allow the dis-
continuance of their study of individual word-pairs. 
A study of Kellas, McCauley, and McFarland {1975) may be interpre-
ted similarly. In this experiment, subjects self-paced their study of 
lists of words. Each list was presented only once and a free recall 
test trial occurred immediately afterwards. One group was allowed to 
study covertly; another group was required to rehearse overtly. Both 
groups recalled a similar number of words. However, the overt rehearsal 
group utilized far more study time than the covert rehearsal group. If 
one accepts Landauer's {1962) conclusion that subvocal speech is not 
essentially faster than overt speech, the temporal difference between the 
two groups would not seem to have resulted from verbalization itself. 
Instead, it seems plausible that subjects using overt rehearsal were at 
least implicitly aware of the limitations placed on their future reten-
tion by the requirement of overt rehearsal and therefore self-paced their 
study at a much slower rate than that chosen by the covert rehearsal 
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subjects. 
However, in other laboratory studies, estimation of one's own know-
ledge state has not always been so accurate. Shaughnessy, Zimmerman, and 
Underwood (1972) allowed subjects to self-pace their study of a list of 
words in which some items were repeated contiguously (massed presenta-
tion or MP items) while other items were repeated only after different 
words intervened (distributed presentation or DP items). Subjects chose 
to study MP items for less time than DP items and subsequently recalled 
less MP than DP items. 
To examine why subjects allot less study time to MP than to DP 
items, Zechmeister and Shaughnessy (1974) asked subjects to predict their 
likelihood of recalling individual words on an immediately forthcoming 
free recall trial. It was found that, while recall was greater for DP 
than for MP items, the predictions of future recall were higher for the 
MP items. It would seem that the method of presentation misled subjects 
into overevaluating the present memorial status of the MP items. · 
The gist of the above studies would seem to be that subjects are 
able to some degree to estimate the present memorial status of to be 
learned material but that such judgments are imperfect. The further 
evaluation of the nature of this skill is the theoretical concern of the 
present research. 
Research on the subjective awareness of one's degree of knowledge 
regarding the memorial status of information while it is·being learned 
may also have practical implications. That is, teachers are often at a 
loss to evaluate a student's statement that he or she had studied sub-
stantially for.a test but still did poorly. When item difficulty and 
personal veracity are not at issue, one wonders why a correlation between 
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study time and test scores did not materialize. Perhaps such low per-
formance is the result of a poorly developed capability at evaluating 
one's present state of knowledge. Should one falsely evaluate a present 
state of knowledge regarding, for example, the formula for variance, and 
on this basis discontinue its further memorization, even a good grasp of 
the concept will not later be of much assistance in either formula recall 
or computation. If the factors influencing such personal evaluations 
can be clarified, some service may be done students of all ages. 
Judgment of Knowing 
The present research is concerned with what is herein called a 
judgment of knowing (JK). A JK is defined as the estimation of one's 
later memory for presently studied information. It is suggested that, 
to be accurate, this prediction of future performance must involve at 
least two components. The first necessity is an evaluation of the pre-
sent memorial status of the information in que~tion. The second require-
ment is that the evaluation be made in light of the conditions under 
which retention will be tested, i.e., retention interval, number of other 
items to be retained, type of retention test. 
Several sources of knowledge _for a JK can be identified. These 
sources may involve stimulus knowledge, process knowledge, and/or memory 
knowledge. Stimulus knowledge refers to subje~• awareness of the 
relative ease of learning of individual information. Thus, past experi-
ence with words might allow one to predict differential recallability 
on the basis of such stimulus characteristics as pronunciability or 
association value. Since ratings of both item pronunciability and 
association value correlate quite highly with recall (Underwood, 1966), 
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the accuracy of a JK founded on this basis may be rather high. It may 
further be theorized that, if the basis of a JK is stimulus knowledge, a 
more direct memorial examination is unnecessary. 
A second source of information for a JK can be labeled process 
knowledge. Process knowledge refers to a familiarity with the overall 
adequacy of either one's own learning operations or of learning processes 
in general. In an experimental situation, for example, a person who 
twice fails to recall any items in an entire list may well be influenced 
by this process knowledge to make predictions of future nonrecall if he 
is asked to predict his performance on a third list. As with stimulus 
knowledge, process knowledge need not require a memorial examination in 
order to be accurate. 
It is plausible that a combination of stimulus and process know-
ledge is sufficient to predict future retention. That is, if a PA item 
appears hard to learn and if the pair has been rehearsed only one time, 
a prediction of future nonrecall would seem to have a high likelihood 
of later being proven correct. 
However, evidence is present that the human memory system has 
some self-knowledge of its own contents (v.g., Hart, 1965; Brown & 
McNeill, 1966) and that subjects rather accurately indicate whether an 
answer iri PA recall is correct (v.g., Suboski, Pappas, & Murray, 1966a). 
Therefore, the possibility exists that such knowledge of one's own 
memory is also present more immediately after a learning attempt. 
Memory knowledge may be taken to refer to the knowledge that a 
memory has been formed, that an attribute now exists in memory which was 
not previously present. Such knowledge is seen as different from stim-
ulus knowledge because it results from an attempt to learn information 
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and because it is not based on already known information. Similarly, 
memory knowledge is seen as other than process knowledge because process 
knowledge merely states that certain operations have been performed on 
information. 
The definition of the three types of knowledge and their respective 
roles in the JK may be better clarified by an examination of three 
learning situations. 
In one learning situation (v.g., the PA learning of tub-venom), 
a subject may be immediately aware of a strong associate to one term 
(v.g., snake to venom). Such knowledge is already present in the sub-
ject's memory and hence is defined as stimulus knowledge. It may lead 
to a judgment that the PA is learnable and thus may serve as the basis 
for a JK. If a mental image uniting the to be learned terms (v.g., a 
bathtub filled with snakes spewing liquid) also becomes present, such a 
visual associate is seen as a new attribute present in one's memory and 
is labeled memory knowledge. Further, awareness of the efficacy of a 
vivid image as a retrieval cue may be labeled process knowledge. Al-
though all three types of knowledge are present in such an example, the 
sine qua ~ character of memory knowledge in such a situation would 
seem to validate its role as the basis of a positive JK. 
It may also be noted that there is at least the logical necessity 
of a less explicit type of memory knowledge in all similar situations in 
which past knowledge is utilized in new learning. Thus, in the above 
example, a subject must have some means of distinguishing between cues 
(v.g., snakes, spewed liquid, poison) and the to be learned associate 
(v.g., venom). Neither stimulus knowledge nor process knowledge can be 
effective in this regard. Some attribute must therefore be present in 
memory to allow the appropriate discrimination. This may be a memory 
for the relatively greater rehearsal frequency of the to be retained, 
term, of its temporal priority, or perhaps even the memory that the re-
sponse term is an associate of the mental picture. Explicit awareness 
of such memory knowledge is not as important as its logically necessary 
presence in many situations in which future recall is predicted on the 
basis of information already in memory. 
A second learning situation is one in which a subject discovers 
an associative mechanism whose adequacy as a retrieval aid is uncertain. 
For the PA 'bat-hindrance', for example, a subject may picture a base-
ball bat held horizontally at arm's length. This learning experience 
may be classified as similar to that previously mentioned. However, the 
possibility exists that the association between bat and hindrance was 
learned in such a way that the imaginal cue was secondary. The basis 
for the prediction may be the learned material itself. Thus, the ex-
ample may also be considered analogous to the third learning situation. 
A less ambiguous designation is not presently ~ssible. 
A third learning situation is one in which the utility of associ-
ative or mediational cues is limited, v.g., ~s of colleagues, 
foreign vocabulary, or PA learning when no mediators arise. In such 
circumstances, rehearsal is of paramount importance during original 
learning. However, the decision must eventually be made that an item is 
"known" so that rehearsal may be discontinued. Although self-testing 
may be utilized for such decisions, the possibility existsthat the 
determination to end rehearsal and to begin self-testing is itself the 
result of some knowledge about an item's memorial status. 
Since stimulus knowledge and process knowledge offer little 
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assistance regarding decisions as to the degree of response-learning, 
the knowledge involved would seem to be memory knowledge. In such in-
stances, however, the new attributes added to memory would have to be 
the phonetic, visual, or orthographic attributes of the to be learned 
material rather than associative attributes related to the material. 
Further, for subjects to have confidence in such judgments, some cues 
must be available which indicate that learning has occurred. 
Potential candidates as cues are the physiological changes which 
have been found to accompany stages of learning. That is, variations 
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in skin resistance levels have been found for different degrees of 
learning (Kintsch, 1965). Similarly, differential eye-movements have 
been discovered during different stages of learning (McCormack & Hal-
trecht, 1966). If subjects have a minimal degree of awareness of such 
correlates of learned states (and hence of memory knowledge), the changes 
in arousal level may allow somewhat accurate JK ratings. 
A more hypothetical basis for a memorially based JK is the sensory 
feedback from a response which closed-loop theory postulates as being 
laid down during learning (Adams, 1968). The existence of such a per-
ceptual trace is theorized to serve as a referent for determining the 
correctness of future occurrences of the response. If proprioceptive 
feedback has a role during recall, a "sense" of the extent of its for-
mation during learning would seem to be a potential substratum for a 
JK. 
Although it has seemed necessary to establish differences between 
various potential bases for the JK, it must be emphasized that the 
present research design allows only very general statements regarding 
sources for the JK. 
Comparison with ~ of learning and feeling of knowing judgments 
A JK is seen as related to two other types of judgments which have 
received some attention in research on learning and memory--ease of 
learning {EL) ratings and the feeling of knowing {FK) which was intro-
duced by Hart {1965). 
The EL judgment and the Judgment of Knowing. To introduce the 
concept of an EL judgment, the procedure for one group of subj.ects in 
an experiment by Underwood {1966) may be described. Subjects were first 
shown a list of 27 three-letter combinations which covered a wide range 
of learning difficulty, from three-letter words to difficult consonant 
syllables. They were told to imagine seeing the trigrams presented 
singly at a 2-sec. rate for a series of study trials and having to re-
call them on alternating test trials. After being asked to examine all 
the trigrams "to get a 'feel' for the range of Mfficulty," the subjects 
were asked to draw lines next to each trigram to indicate the speed with 
which they thought they would learn it. The 3ioes were to be drawn 
proportionate to item difficulty so that, for example, a trigram judged 
twice as difficult to learn as another would .receive a line twice as 
long. Afterwards, the trigrams were presented siD&lY for six study-
test trials. The average length of the EL lines for individual trigrams 
-was then correlated with the average number correct for that item to 
serve as a measure of EL predictive accuracy. This correlation was very 
~h (.9~) and was similar to that between this grGUp's mean EL scaling 
for the items and mean learning scores for the items by a group of sub-
jects which did not make EL judgments. 
In being asked to make an EL judgment, theref.ore, a subject is 
asked to draw on past experience with similar stimuli (i.e., on what 
9 
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bas been previously lab~led "stimulus knowledge") to make a probabilis-
. . 
tic 4ecision as to the amount of time or effort required to establish a 
memory. 
In contrast to the EL rating, the JK is an estimate of the present 
status of knowledge rather than of the relative potential learnability 
of particular items. Hence, it can only be made during an attempt to 
learn information. Further, a JK is only valid until some definite 
future time. 
An example can more clearly distinguish EL and JK ratings. If two 
subjects with identical past histories were to have a study trial on 
the same material and one were then asked for an EL judgment and the 
other for a JK, both on similarly ascending six-point scales, the EL 
ratings for a certain item may be a 4 to indicate a moderately easy to 
learn item, while the JK may be a 2 to indicate the improbability of 
recall on the next trial--and both judgments could be accurate. How-
ever, if the same judgments were again asked after five more study trials, 
the ideal EL rater would be expected to make the same judgment, while 
the ideal JK subject (under the assumption that learning had occurred 
for the particular item) would be expected to give a much higher JK 
than the earlier evaluation. 
The FK judgment and the Judgment of Knowing. Though the feeling 
of knowing paradigm introduced by Hart (1965) has undergone methodolog-
ical variations (cf. Hart, 1967a; Blake, 1973}, an examination of the 
original procedure permits a clear differentiation between the feeling 
of knowing and the JK. In the Hart (1965} experiment, subjects first 
were asked general information questions, such as the name of the painter 
of "Afternoon at La Grand Jatte." If a subject could not supply the 
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answer for a question, he was asked to indicate whether or not he felt 
. i 
he knew the answer to the extent that he could recognize it among sever-
al alternatives. A YES response was thus considered an indication of a 
subject's being in a FK state. After all the questions had been pre-
sented, the subject was asked to select the correct answer from four 
similar alternatives for each question. As an example, the alternatives 
for the above question were Monet, Cezanne, Seurat, and Dufy. 
To assess FK accuracy, Hart subtracted the proportion of correct 
recognitions given a NO FK judgment from the proportion of correct re-
cognitions given a YES FK judgment. It was theorized tha~ if feelings 
of knowing were accurate indicators of memory storage, subjects would 
recognize more test items about which they had a feeling of knowing than 
items they had predicted would be unrecognizable. The difference 
supported this prediction. However, this and later studies (Hart, 1967a, 
1967b; Blake, 1973) have also shown that subjects were able to select 
the correct alternative at better than chance levels when they had previ-
ously indicated no feeling of knowing. This inability to predict non-
recognition was interpreted by Hart (1965) as due to the lack of equally 
likely alternatives so that "a person ignorant of the correct answer but . 
possessing some related knowledge of the field covered by the question 
might be able to narrow the alternatives down to three or two, thereby 
raising his guessing probability to .33 or .50" (p. 211). 
To the extent that a FK judgment is a subjective indication that 
a memory has or has not been established (Underwood, 1969), both a FK 
judgment and a JK are similar. However, there are important differences. 
An appropriate reference point for determining dissimilarities 
between a JK and a FK judgment may be the presence or absence of the 
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relevant stimulus. With the to be learned stimulus present, a subject 
is able to use either stimulus knowledge, process knowledge, or memory 
knowledge to arrive at a JK. With the to be learned stimulus absent, 
however, stimulus knowledge is excluded by definition as a factor in FK 
judgments. Nevertheless, like a JK, a FK judgment may.be based on pro-
cess knowledge. That is, a subject in a laboratory learning task who 
has been presented a trigram and is later asked to give a FK judgment 
when it can not be recalled in its entirety (i.e., Blake, 1973) may re-
member that he had rehearsed the item more than other items and, on this 
basis, predict future recognition. Since the greater accrued frequency 
for the correct alternative may lead to successful recognition (Under-
wood, 1971), this basis for a FK judgment may be quite accurate and not 
involve item specific memory knowledge. 
However, a prediction of future recognition based on process know-
ledge, i.e., a FK judgment, would appear to require less of the subject 
than a prediction of future recall based on process knowledge, i.e., a 
JK. That is, inasmuch as recall is usually considered to require search 
and retrieval (cf. McCormack, 1972), a JK based on process knowledge 
would likely require an evaluation of the retrieval potentialities of 
the specific processing performed. Contrariwise, to the extent that · 
recognition does not require search and retrieval (cf. McCormack, 1972), 
a FK judgment based on process knowledge need DDtdemand as elaborate an 
examination. 
A further distinction between a JK and a FK judgment is seen when 
both are considered to be based on memory knowledge. For a JK, the 
memory knowledge utilized is theorized to be ~ of the present memori-
al status or degree of learning of the material •. For a FK judgment, 
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however, the memory knowledge utilized would seem to be either or both 
of two kinds. A first basis may be target related information which is 
inherent in the proffered question itself, that is, information concern-
ing the population of potential targets (Koriat & Lieblich, 1974). With 
respect to the previously sought painter's name, for instance, knowledge 
of the painting's pointillistic style may lead one to expect that he or 
she will be able to select the correct alternative from among painters 
of different styles. In other instances, however, knowledge of the 
potential alternatives may cause one to give a negative FK. A second 
memory basis for an FK judgment may be attribute knowledge of the target 
(Blake, 1973). In the present example, such a basis might be the know-
ledge or "feeling" that the name has two syllables and begins with 
either the letter "S" or the letter "T". In contrast to the JK, then, 
the memory knowledge used for an FK judgment is sometimes merely on the 
tip of one's tongue. 
Research relevant to memorial self-knowledge 
Although direct experimentation on what has been labeled a JK is 
rare, a goodly number of studies may be related to memorial self-know-
ledge. That is, eventually the question which must be asked regarding 
the JK is whether it is based on stimulus, process, or memory knowledge. 
Research relevant to memorial self-knowledge is of much importance in 
this regard. However, the studies to be mentioned were rarely designed 
to distinguish the three types of knowledge. Thus, no further attempt 
will be made to specify memorial self-knowledge iD these articles. Be-
cause of the relative disparateness of the individual experiments, they 
will be considered under the general areas of psychology rather than 
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under topic headings. The areas will be educational psychology, develop-
mental psychology, physiology, and learning-memory. 
Educational psychology and memorial self-knowledge. A persistent 
concern in educational psychology has been the value of changing answers 
in multiple-choice tests. Although the conventional wisdom emphasizes 
trust in first impressions, research has consistently found changes to 
be beneficial (v.g., Lowe & Crawford, 1929; Reile & Briggs, 1952; Foote 
& Belinky, 1972). For example, Foote and Belinky (1972) found that 55% 
of the changes on four introductory psychology tests were from incorrect 
to correct, while only 22% were in the opposite direction. Also, Reile 
and Briggs (1952) found that A and B students made less changes than D 
and F students but profited more from the conversions. Because such 
situations must involve considerable doubt, it may be plausibly argued 
that many of these correct changes are based:IDOTe on "feelings" than on 
rational elimination of alternatives. However, the methodological 
difficulties of classroom research demand many limits on such hypothe-
sizing. 
A second relevant concern of educational research has been the 
effect of immediate knowledge of results (KR) on test performance. For 
example, fifth and sixth grade students who were given feedback in a 
multiple-choice situation were found to profit only slightly on a later 
recall test regarding similar information relative to students of matched 
ability who had not been given immediate feedback (Hanna, 1976). Imme-
diate KR has also been found to have a slight positive effect on the 
final examination scores of college students but to have no significant 
effect on the performance of either high school or college students on 
a total of ten shorter within-course tests (Beeson, 1973). Likewise, 
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graduate students were found to perform more poorly in a KR testing sit-
uation than in a delayed feedback setting (Strang & Rust, 1973). In all 
such experiments, some roles would seem to be present for both the mon-
itoring and the cueing functions of knowledge of results. More impor-
tantly, however, the general smallness of the effect would seem to sub-
stantiate the hypothesis of Ross (1933) that students' intrinsic judg-
. 
ments of accuracy tend to be very high. Further validation of this comes 
from Hanna's finding that the slight improvement due to total feedback 
over no feedback was present only among medium and low ability grammar 
school students and not among high ability students. 
More direct evidence of the accuracy of subjective knowledge 
regarding the correctness of one's own responses in a classroom situation 
comes from an experiment by Blum (1935). Subjects were asked to predict 
their number of correct multiple-choice selections out of 100 questions. 
Students who scored highly tended to .make very accurate estimates (a 
predicted mean of 82.8 correct answers versus.an actual mean of 83.3 
correct answers). However, students who scored low were rather inaccu-
rate in their self-estimates (a predicted mean of 74.4 correct answers 
versus an actual mean of 55.8 correct answers). 
A final relevant concern in the educational psychology literature 
is the accuracy of subjective estimates of overall academic performance, 
particularly in comparison to standardized tests. Binder, Jones, and 
Strowig (1970) correlated high school students' grade point averages 
(GPA) with scores on a self-concept of ability scale. Correlations from 
two different samples of boys were .56 and .51; correlations for two 
groups of girls were .71 and .67. Biggs and Tinsley (1970) used essen-
tially the same inventory to assess college students' estimates of their 
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academic ability. The correlation with GPA was .54. When general aca-
demic achievement as measured by American College Test scores was held 
constant, the correlation remained of moderate strength at .41. Also, 
as has been found with students who accurately predict their performance 
on individual course tests, more accurate predictors of overall college 
grades were higher in GPA scores and, expectedly, tended to predict 
higher GPA scores than less precise self-evaluators (Keefer, 1971). 
Taken as a whole, the results from in-class experimentation present 
evidence of students' rather sophisticated awareness of both their 
memorial contents and capabilities. 
Developmental psychology and memorial self-knowledge. Develop-
mental changes in the knowledge individuals have regarding their memorial 
capability have been investigated indirectly by experiments which observe 
children's activities during memory tasks. For example, Rogoff, New-
combe, and Kagan (1974) asked subjects to self-pace their study of 40 
stimulus pictures in anticipation of a recognition task which was. to 
occur in either minutes, one day, or one week. Eight year old children 
took more time to study items for the two longer retention intervals 
while six and four year olds studied the items for the same time regard-
less of the retention interval. 
In a similar vein, Flavell, Beach, and Chinsky (1966) observed the 
spontaneous verbalizations of kindergarteners, second-graders, and fifth-
graders during study and test periods of a nonverbal (pointing) serial 
recall task. An increase in detectable verbalization was _found from 
kindergarten to fifth grade. One interpretation of this continuing 
increase in rehearsal and verbal coding is that it indicates an increas-
ing awareness of the efficacy of such plans for memorial tasks (Flavell 
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~ al., 1966). 
Similar results were obtained by Appel, Cooper, Knight, McCarrell, 
Yussen, and Flavell (1972) when they asked preschoolers, first-graders, 
and fifth-graders either to look at or to remember a series of pictures. 
Preschoolers showed the same kinds of study behaviors and recalled the 
same number of items under the two instructional sets. Although first-
graders also did not study differentially under the two conditions, re-
call performance in one experiment was found to be superior under the 
memorization instructions. Fifth-graders, however, studied differently 
for the two tasks--and recalled more under the memorization instructions. 
A more direct approach to the study of the development of subjec-
tive knowledge about memorial capabilities compared children's predicted 
and actual memory spans. Flavell, Friedrichs, and Hoyt (1970) had 
children from nursery school to fourth grade predict their memory span 
. 
by indicating whether or not they could serially recall all the items 
presented to them on strips of paper. From 1 to 10 items were on each 
strip. The papers were shown in ascending order of set size. The 
actual span was tested by serial repetitions of the experimenter's oral 
presentations of series of items. 
Errors indicated that children could be separated into those who 
predicted a memory span of ten items and those who predicted less than 
ten items. Children who predicted a ten item span almost never recalled 
so many items and were seen as merely assenting to the highest span 
offered by the experimenter. Children who predicted memo~y spans of 
less than ten items, however, were found to be rather accurate. For 
example, nursery school children were in error by an average of only 
1.7 items, while fourth-graders were off by only 0.9 items. 
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Another direct evaluation of children's knowledge of their memories 
was an experiment by Berch and Evans (1973). Kindergarteners and third-
graders were compared in the accuracies of their confidence regarding 
items' being OLD in a continuous recognition task. A four-point scale 
of confidence contained photographs of "doubtful" and "smiling" children. 
The two photographs represented two degrees of confidence for both OLD 
and NEW judgments. It was found that the lower the child's level of 
confidence in judging an item as OLD, the lower was the probability that 
the item was actually a repetition. Even for kindergarteners, the prob-
ability of an item's being OLD was found to decrease with the four con-
fidence levels (.80, .68, .30, .23). To some extent, then, even 5~ year 
olds can monitor their memory states. 
Physiology and memorial self-knowledge. The present section will 
review research which has related the learning process to changes in 
eye movements, pupillary dilation, the galvanic skin response, electro-
encephalographic recordings, and heart rate. Although these processes 
generally occur without conscious direction, perceptible differences 
among levels of these correlates of states of learning may be sufficient 
cues for accurate judgments of knowing. 
The results of an experiment by McCormack and Haltrecht (1966) are 
typical of research which has monitored eye-movements. Subjects learning 
pairs of nonsense syllables in the study-test procedure were found orig-
inally to spend more time viewing the response than the stimulus term. 
Within three trials, however, a cross-over occurred and subjects began 
devoting more attention to the stimulus term. When Haltrecht and 
McCormack (1966) observed the eye movements of fast and slow learners, 
they found that slow learners exhibited the cross-over effect. Fast 
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learners, however, were found to view the stimulus more than the response 
term from the outset and the difference increased with practice. Over 
trials, subjects also tended to look away from learned pairs. This was 
especially true for fast learners. 
The experimenters also examined the three most easy and three most 
difficult CVC pairs for each slow learner. The cross-over point for the 
fixations on the difficult pairs was observed to occur on a later trial 
than that for the easy pairs. If subjects are somehow aware of such 
differential responses to items or if such response-changes are related 
to the more general indices of arousal which will be discussed below, 
a somewhat reliable cue for the JK is present. 
A second physiological variable which has been observed in rela-
tion to learning and memory has been pupillary dilation. The research 
of Kahneman and his associates has dealt with more general concerns than 
stages of learning. However, a consistent finding has been that peak 
pupillary dilation is a function of momentary memory load, with a 
larger number of items to be recalled correlating with greater dilation 
(Kahneman & Beatty, 1966). More relevant to the present study is a 
finding by Colman and Paivio (1970). Pupillary dilation was shown to 
be greater for abstract than for concrete stimulus terms in a PA learn-
ing task. The reaction would seem, therefore, to be a rather sophisti-
cated index of task difficulty. 
The galvanic skin response (GSR) has also been studied in relation 
to the learning of particular items. Brown (1937) had subjects learn 
a list of 19 nonsense syllables of 0% association value to a criterion 
of one complete anticipation of the entire list. The galvanic deflec-
tions were greater on trials when the subject's response was incorrect 
than on those trials on which a correct anticipation was made. Greater 
deflections, then, were associated with the learning of a syllable than 
with its correct anticipation. 
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A design which is less affected by the learning state of previous 
items than would seem to have been true for Brown's subjects is one 
utilized by Kintsch (1965) to measure the temporary changes in subjects' 
skin resistance levels during the test periods of PA learning. Twelve 
nonsense syllables paired with the numbers 1 or 2 were the to be learned 
material. On test trials before the last error on a particular item, 
subjects tended to react with rather large GSRs to the presentations of 
the stimulus term, with no difference in GSR magnitude for errors and 
successes. On trials after the last error for an individual item, how-
ever, habituation set in and the reactions for that item declined in 
magnitude, becoming much lower than the initial values. It may be 
suggested that such changes in the GSR resulted from some awareness of 
the appropriateness of subjects' own state of knowledge of the individual 
paired-associates. 
The pattern with electroencephalographic (EEG) correlates of verbal 
learning appears similar to that of the above indices. Thompson and 
Obrist (1964) had subjects learn a list of twelve nonsense syllables by 
the serial anticipation method. Maximal changes in voltage reduction 
occurred when syllables were first anticipated correctly. Since such 
electrocortica~ changes tended to diminish with practice, they were 
considered to reflect variations in attention. ·~--
Although heart rate has not apparently been studied on an item 
specific basis, research by Kahneman, Tursky, Shapiro, and Crider (1969) 
indicates that heart rate peaks as a function cf task difficulty in a 
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digit transformation task. 
In summary, then, relationships have been found between physiolog-
ical indices and degrees of learning. Such correlations have been found 
even at the level of individual items. It may be theorized that such 
changes in subjective arousal occur because a previous cognitive eval-
uation has indicated that some learning has occurred. A vague awareness 
of only one of the various indices would seem a good cue for many item-
specific judgments of knowing. 
A different approach to the role of physiological cues as they 
correlate with degrees of learning is the application of closed loop 
theory to verbal learning (Adams, 1967, 1968). The theory maintains 
that both a memory trace and a perceptual trace are formed during learn-
ing. The perceptual traces are seen as laid down by both response-
produced stimuli and by environmental stimuli. During later recall or 
recognition, the matching of sensory feedback from a response with the 
appropriate perceptual trace serves as a discriminative cue regarding 
the correctness of that response. 
The finding that recall is positively related to the number of 
sense modalities in learning (Murray, 1965) is cited as support for the 
theory. Similarly, an experiment in short-term memory by Adams, Mcintyre, 
and Thorsheim (1969) found poorer recall following interference with 
both audio- and tactual-proprioceptive feedback than with either single 
modality interference or with no interference. If perceptual traces are 
indeed laid down during learning, their relative strength presents a 
potential cue for a correct JK. Such perceptual traces may even be 
theorized to underlie the previously mentioned correlation between 
learned states and physiological changes. 
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Learning-memory and memorial self-knowledge. Research on learning 
and memory may be divided into experimentation relevant to FK judgments 
and to JK ratings. 
Some of the FK studies since the original Hart (1965) experiments 
have sought to extend the generality of the phenomenon. Thus, Hart 
(1967a) later validated the concept of memory-monitoring in the PA learn-
ing of trigrams. Similarly, Yarmey (1973) has shown the accuracy of FK 
judgments regarding photographs of famous persons and the names of the 
people pictured. On a more general level, Gruneberg and his associates 
have shown the FK to be a valid predictor of later spontaneous recall 
for presently unrecallable information (Gruneberg, Smith, & Winfrow, 
1973) and of cued recall (Grueneberg & Monks, 1974). 
Other researchers have attempted to discover the bases of FK 
judgments. Blake (1973) attempted to distinguish recalled partial in-
formation from all other retrieved attribute information which might 
serve as a potential basis for a positive FK. In two experiments, the 
Peterson and Peterson (1959) short-term memory paradigm was used in 
which brief presentations of consonant trigrams were soon followed by a 
recall attempt. If recall was incorrect, an FK rating was requested 
prior to a recognition selection from eight alternatives. In the first 
experiment, the eight alternatives were devised so as to limit the util-
ity of partial knowledge. That is, the incorrect alternatives were 
similar to the target by containing up to two of the correct letters. 
The same alternatives were shown to all subjects. The results indicated 
that FK judgments in the short-term memory task were similar in accuracy 
to FK judgments regarding general information questions. The second 
experiment differed only in that the recognition alternatives given the 
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subject always contained whatever correct information the subject had 
recalled. That is, if the target were KSW and the subject had recalled 
LSV, all eight alternatives contained S as the middle letter. FK 
accuracy was reduced substantially. Further, the likelihood of a pos-
itive FK judgment was only slightly less than in the first experiment 
and mirrored the first experiment by increasing as a function of the 
number of trigram consonants which had been correctly recalled. The 
role of partial recall in a trigram recall-FK task, then, is rather 
striking. Still, the difference between Hit and Miss rates was reliable. 
Partial recall would thus seem to be important in a FK judgment more as 
a constituent of retrieved attribute information than as the sole basis 
for a positive FK. Although Blake did not further specify the nature 
of such "retrieved attribute information," the present theorizing would 
allow the inclusion of process and memory knowledge. For example, if 
the retrieved attribute knowledge included a memory for a significant 
amount of repetition for an item, such information may be expected to be 
a very good predictor of future recognition performance. 
Other researchers have emphasized the role of general knowledge 
in FK accuracy. DaPolito, Guttenplan, and Steinitz (1968) asked sub-
jects general information questions and, if recall was incorrect, for 
FK judgments. In contrast to other research, however, subjects were 
asked to eliminate as many incorrect alternatives as possible before they 
indicated their recognition choice for each question. The results 
offered the possibility that subjects are better at eliminating incorrect 
alternatives than at recognizing the correct response. However, the 
value of such information may be expected to vary directly with the 
similarity of the alternatives present as answers. 
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The value of general knowledge in answering specific questions has 
been more directly examined in terms of the "tip-of-the-tongue" (TOT) 
phenomenon first studied by Brown and McNeill (1966). These authors 
read definitions of relatively unfamiliar words. When subjects were 
unable to recall a defined word but felt the word on the tip of their 
tongue, they were found to have some knowledge of the initial and final 
letters in the missing word, the number of syllables in the word, and 
the location of the primary stress. 
Koriat and Lieblich (1974) have presented a more refined method-
ological analysis of the TOT data. Of most theoretical importance were 
tests of the hypothesis that subjects in a TOT state possess information 
regarding unretrieved words which is different from class or population 
information. Subjects' answers regarding both initial-final letters 
and number of syllables were found to have some basis in general infor-
mation regarding the probability of occurrence of such characteristics 
in the population of infrequent words. Nevertheless, item-specific 
detection was also substantiated. The general information had by sub-
jects was not sufficient to explain their success rates. 
Rubin (1975) has differed from the other investigators of TOT 
states by his consideration of a rather small number of definitions 
presented to a large group of subjects. Only words which subjects had 
indicated to be the experimenter's targets were scored. Initial letters 
and final clusters were recalled with impressive proportions when sub-
jects claimed to be in the TOT state. -~ 
In general, then, research on retrieval from long-term memory has 
shown the importance of general knowledge in FK judgments. Similarly, 
such experimentation has strengthened a role for knowledge of item-
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specific information in the FK judgment. If the JK can be shown similar 
to the FK, similar conclusions about the role of item-specific informa-
tion in the JK may be expected. 
Research in the area of learning and memory which is relevant to 
the JK may be categorized into studies on self-pacing and studies on 
confidence ratings. 
Zacks (1969) has replicated the previously mentioned results of 
Bugelski and Rickwood (1963) regarding the total time invariance for 
experimenter-paced and subject-paced tasks. Further, subjects were found 
to devote more study time to difficult than to easy pairs. Lastly, self-
reports in the experimenter-paced conditions indicated the existence of 
greater covert rehearsal for the pairs which were empirically defined 
as difficult to learn. 
The role of self-knowledge is also manifest in an experiment by 
Royer (1973). Subjects were asked to study Turkish-English vocabulary 
in a PA task. One group of subjects was instructed to study to mastery 
while using a self-test method in which they were allowed to look at the 
reverse side of an index card which contained only the stimulus term. 
The subjects in a second group were temporally yoked to the first group 
but had no ability to self-test. Study by the third group was self-paced 
but overt self-testing was not allowed. The two self-paced groups 
learned more items than the yoked group--without significant differences 
in amount of study time. Subjects seem able to assess their present 
state of knowledge without any direct chance for self-test~ng. 
Among the experiments on confidence judgments, two offer comments 
as to the potential basis of such judgments. Adams and Adams (1960) 
had subjects evaluate the correctness of the spelling of various words. 
Confidence ratings were found to increase with accuracy as well as with 
familiarity. Another experiment by Adams and Adams (1958) found a 
similar monotonically increasing relationship between familiarity and 
confidence regarding judgments of synonymity and antonymity. 
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With a different goal in mind, Suboski and his associates have 
also investigated confidence judgments in the PA learning paradigm. An 
early experiment (Suboski, Pappas, & Murray, 1966a) used the study-test 
method with lists of ten letter-number pairs. During test periods which 
occurred after each of three presentations of a list, subjects also 
rated their confidence in their responses on a five-point scale. The 
probability of a response being correct was found to increase monoton-
ically from .20 to about .90 for the five confidence levels. More im-
portant was the finding that, on the second test trial, the probability 
of the highest confidence rating (5) for twice recalled items was an 
increasing function of confidence during the first test trial. The 
authors felt this to support the hypothesis that confidence ratings 
reflect the strength of the learned association between stimulus and 
response terms. 
Suboski, Pappas, and Murray (1966b) also replicated the experiment 
in a Study-Test-Test paradigm. Presentation of each list was followed 
after 15-sec. by two tests, each 15-sec. apart. Letter-number items 
correct on the first test trial but incorrect on the second test trial 
(CN items) were found to have been given significantly lower confidence 
ratings on the first trial than items correct on both trials (CC items). 
Likewise, items incorrect on the first but correct on the second test 
(NC items) were given reliably higher confidence ratings on the second 
trial than were given to items in the reversed situation (CN items)--
even though the ratings had been higher on the first trial for the CN 
items. Similar results have also been obtained by means of signal de-
tection analysis of both recognition tasks (Pappas & Suboski, 1966) and 
Study-Test-Test tasks (Suboski, 1967). 
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However, others have argued that such confidence ratings are not 
mediated by an item's response strength. Thus, Grasha, Schumsky, and 
Elliott (1973) investigated relationships between short-term recall, in-
trusions, and subjective certainty ratings regarding recalled items. 
Mean ratings for intrusion items as a function of initial repetition 
condition were found not to correspond to the probability of occurrence 
of intrusion items. The intrusions were also described by a conditional 
probability measure which was meant to adjust for response availability. 
Response availability was assumed to be differential because there were 
different numbers of repetitions for items as well as different retention 
intervals. However, the mean rating data did not correspond to the 
conditional probabilities of intrusions. The authors felt that such 
noncorrespondence would not be expected if confidence ratings directly 
reflected response strength. Because the confidence ratings decreased 
over the initial retention interval and increased as a function of the 
number of initial repetitions, Grasha, Schumsky, and Elliott concluded 
that such ratings reflect relative certainty regarding correctness. In 
the present terminology, "certainty regarding correctness" would seem to 
refer to process knowledge because the ratings appear to be based on 
general principles. 
The results of a continuous PA learning experiment by Bernbach and 
Bower (1970) also offer support for the role of nonspecific factors in 
confidence ratings regarding recalled items. Subj~cts were found to have 
a bias to give higher confidence ratings for later presentations, inde-
pendent of the correctness of recall. 
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A different source of confidence ratings was studied in an exper-
iment by Arbuckle and Cuddy (1969), namely, subjects' "ability to dis-
criminate differences in associative strength." In terms of the present 
paper, this would seem to refer to stimulus knowledge. Subjects were to 
learn lists of five, six, or seven letter-number pairs at a presentation 
rate of 3-sec., with one study and one test trial per list. On the 
first trial, subjects predicted whether or not they would recall the 
appropriate response term on the next trial. 
The predictions of these well-practiced subjects were much more 
accurate than chance expectations. For each subject, the frequency of 
predictions of future recall was also very similar to the frequency of 
correct recalls. Other subjects were then asked to rate the perceived 
difficulty of some of the pairs. It was found that the modal difficulty 
rating of the pairs decreased with the relative frequency of predictions 
of recall. It may be pointed out, however, that the rated pairs were 
limited to ones which had previously been given the same YES or NO rat-
ing by the pair of subjects who had studied them. 
A second experiment was also performed in which naive subjects 
were tested by the probe technique (only one item from a list was "probed" 
during recall). The lists contained five noun PAs. The results in-
dicated that for the first four serial positions, recall was a decreasing 
function of previous predictions. Words in the fifth position were re-
called almost perfectly regardless of the prediction. Because such 
judgments did not interfere with learning as measured by the recall of 
nonjudging control subjects, the authors theorize that the assessment of 
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information required overtly by such predictions is made covertly in 
standard PA learning situations. The results would seem to offer clear 
predictions for the present inquiry. 
The Present Research 
This study poses four questions relative to judgments of knowing. 
Because of the general lack of knowledge about predictions of future 
recall performance, the questions are more empirically than theoretically 
motivated. However, the data also offer some sense of direction about 
the basis for the JK. 
The first question asks whether subjects can improve JK accuracy 
with practice. The second question examines the relationship between 
ease of learning judgments and JK ratings for the same items. Thirdly, 
subject variables are utilized to test the validity of theoretical pre-
dictions. That is, if memorial self-knowledge is involved in the JK, 
then subjects adept at FK judgments ought also to be proficient at the 
JK. Similarly, if capability at the JK is relevant to school perfor-
mance, high correlations should be expected between JK performance and 
scholastic achievement scores. To the extent that high correlations 
are not found, similarity in task requirements becomes less likely. 
Lastly, the relationship between learning ability and the EL, FK, and 
JK tasks is examined. 
At this point it will be helpful to outline the actual research 
procedure. Table 1 indicates the progress of subjects through the ex-
periment's stages. The first stage was relevant for only half the sub-
jects (Group EL) who made EL judgments on the word pairs they were to 
learn later. In the remaining stages, all subjects performed the same 
Session I. 
Stage One. 
Stage Two. 
TABLE 1 
Outline of sessions, stages, and tasks 
EL ratings for half the subjects (Group EL) 
Five study-test trials on letter-number PAs for all 
subjects 
Stage Three. Four lists of word PAs for all subjects 
Session II. 
Tasks 
Trial 1 2 3 
Study JK Test 
General information questions and feeling of 
knowing judgments for all subjects 
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tasks. 
The second stage involved five PA learning trials on letter-number 
pairs. The intent of this stage was to give subjects familiarization 
with the PA task as well as to provide a basis for separating subjects 
into good and poor learners. 
The third stage involved the learning of four lists of word pairs 
by the study-test method. A pilot study indicated that the average 
subject could recall about half of each list's items after one study 
trial. When learning is at such a level, process knowledge should not 
be a good guide for JK ratings. For each list, then, a single study 
trial preceded a trial during which judgments of knowing were made. The 
next trial was the test trial which evaluated JK accuracy. 
In a second session, subjects were asked a series of general in-
formation questions concerning such areas as history, literature, art, 
and natural science. For incorrectly answered items, an FK judgment 
was requested. This was immediately followed by a recognition test for 
the correct answer from four similar alternatives. 
Question 1· Accuracy, practice, and the Judgment of Knowing 
A finding that the JK is an accurate predictor of recall would be 
to a large extent a replication. Therefore, the major concern of this 
question is the effect of practice on the JK. Because of the introduc-
tory nature of the present study, this concern is more data-oriented 
than theoretical. Specifically, information is sought regarding the 
presence or absence of improvement in JK accuracy with practice, regard-
ing the relationship of any improvement to the specific type of JK pre-
diction (positive or negative), and regarding the role of subjective bias 
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in any listwise changes. 
To motivate subjects to learn and to recall as many items as pos-
sible, this experiment .involved subjects in a game situation. Five 
points were gained for each recalled response term and five points lost 
for each nonrecalled term. Thus, if evaluation apprehension tempted a 
subject to withhold recall of a word previously rated as unrecallable, 
it was hoped that the cost-gain ratio would favor recall rathe~ than 
withholding. 
To encourage subjects to make accurate judgments of knowing, the 
game also involved bonus and penalty points on the basis of JK accuracy. 
These were smaller in value than the recall-nonrecall points in a further 
attempt to discourage either differential study or potential withholding. 
However, the "game-points" also increased parallel to the magnitude of 
the JK so that extreme JK ratings gained (or lost) more points when the 
predictions proved correct (or incorrect) than did moderate JK ratings. 
It was hoped that the competitive nature of college students, together 
with the exhortations of the experimenter to fmp~e their point total 
relative to that on the previous list(s), would preclude subjects from 
using the middle points of the JK scale unless they felt their present 
state of knowledge to be in fact intermediate. 
Question ~· The EL judgment and the Judgment of Knowing 
A concern which past research has not evaluated on an intrasubject 
level is the extent to which subjects might base their judgments of 
knowing on such stimulus characteristics of the to be learned material 
as imagery, association value, or pronunciability ~ather than on an 
examination of their present state of knowledge of the item. To show 
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that the two factors are confoundable, an experiment by Lovelace (1974) 
may be cited. Subjects were first given three successive study trials 
on a 60-item list of words in preparation for later free recall. During 
the fourth presentation, subjects rated each item for their confidence 
regarding its recall on a later test. Across subjects, ·average recall 
on the next trial was a monotonically increasing function of the previous 
confidence ratings. Though an interpretation of the data as indicating 
that subjects are quite aware of the contents of their memories might 
be expected on the basis of previous theorizing, it is also possible that 
subjects were basing their confidence judgments on stimulus knowledge. 
That is, Lovelace's stimuli were as low in imagery value as 2.5 on the 
seven-point imagery scale used by Paivio, Yuille, and Madigan (1968). 
Given the list's frequency, concreteness, association value, and word 
length restrictions, possible stimuli include such words as "reaction" 
and ''advice", together with words such as "sugar" and "ankle". To the 
extent that learning scores correlate with imagery values (cf. Paivio, 
1969), the average subject giving judgments of knowing on the basis of 
this stimulus characteristic would be likely to "know" his or her 
present state of knowledge quite well. However, it cannot be disputed 
that the three 3-sec. study trials given these subjects should have led 
to better learning of the high than the low imagery terms (Paivio, Smythe, 
and Yuille, 1968). Thus, memory examination leading to judgments of 
knowing would possibly yield ratings which correlate with imagery values. 
To examine the relationship between EL judgments and_the JK, the 
present research utilized a PA learning task in which high frequency 
three-letter nouns were stimulus terms. Homogeneous stimulus terms were 
chosen to prevent subjects from basing their judgments of knowing more 
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on stimulus than on response term characteristics. The response terms 
were all two-syllable nouns of rather low frequency of usage in the 
English language. Because of the generally potent effects of imagery on 
learning, even on the response side (Smythe & Paivio, 1968), each list's 
response terms sampled the entire range of imagery values found in the 
Paivio, Yuille, and Madigan (1968) norms. 
Prior to the JK task, therefore, half the subjects made EL judg-
ments on the to be learned material. Specifically, they were asked to 
indicate whether the word-pairs appeared to be hard or easy to learn in 
a PA task. 
It is hoped that the present lack of information about intrasubject 
similarity in the two ratings can be remedied. The presence of such 
ratings ·also allows their comparison with JK ratings as to predictive 
accuracy. Further, the present design allows an examination of the in-
fluence of prior experience with the stimuli on the nature and accuracy 
of later JK ratings. 
Question 1· Feeling of knowing judgments, scholastic achievement, and 
the Judgment of Knowing 
The third area of experimental concern is an attempt to heed the 
suggestion of Underwood (1975) to identify individual-difference var-
iables with theoretical processes. If a theory is to survive, such 
variables ought to predict the direction of subjects' task performance. 
In the present case, FK capability and scholastic achievement have been 
chosen as crucibles regarding two possible facets of the JK. Thus, if 
the JK involves a subjective memorial examination, accuracy at·the JK 
task ought to correlate with accuracy at the FK task because this by 
definition involves some sort of memorial examination. Likewise, if 
scholastic success requires actual judgments of knowing, scholastic 
achievement should correlate with JK performance. As the correlations 
increase, support can be postulated for similar task requirements. 
~uestion !· Learning ability and the Judgment of Knowing 
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A third subject variable which is investigated in the present 
study is learning ability. It is possible that only very fast and very 
slow learners are adept at the JK. Such subjects can be theorized to 
base their JK ratings to a great degree on process knowledge regarding 
their capabilities. A role for item specific knowledge in the JK would 
be thus strengthened if improvement in JK accuracy over lists were found 
to occur for subjects of all levels of learning ability. Learning 
ability may also be investigated for its role in the relationships be-
tween EL, FK, and JK ratings. 
'.-
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CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
Design 
Except for EL ratings required of Group EL in the initial stage of 
this experiment, all subjects had the same tasks. The second ~xperi­
mental stage involved five study-test trials on a letter-number PA list. 
During the third stage, all subjects learned four PA word lists and made 
judgments of knowing prior to each list's test trial. In the second 
session, allsubjectsattempted to answer general information questions. 
For incorrectly answered items, subjects made PK judgments and then 
selected the correct answer from among four alternatives. 
The present design thus allows the evaluation of four hypotheses 
regarding judgments of knowing. The first hypothesis is that JK accura-
cy will improve with practice. The second is that a JK is related to 
an EL judgment for the same item. The third hypothesis is that strong 
correlations will be found when individuals' JK accuracy is compared with 
their FK accuracies and with their scholastic achievement. The last 
is that the relationships found in the first three hypotheses· will be 
found for subjects of all levels of learning ability • 
Lists 
The various stages of the experiment Tequired the creation of three 
different lists of items. A list of letter-number pairs was formed to 
separate subjects on the basis of ~earning ability. A set of .word pairs 
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was constructed to serve as the material for both the EL ratings and the 
judgments of knowing. Thirdly, for the FK task, a list of general in-
formation questions was devised, together with a set of recognition al-
ternatives for each question. 
The word pairs for the stage one EL rating task for Group EL were 
the items studied by all subjects during stage three. Their selection 
and ordering will be described below. 
In stage two PA learning, the stimuli were 16 consonants randomly 
paired with two-digit numbers as response terms. The numbers were 
selected from the Battig and Spera (1962) norms to include an approxi-
mately equal number of low, moderate, and high association value terms. 
All numbers differed from each other by at least one digit. A minimum 
number of digits was repeated. To minimize serial learning, six orders 
were created. 
For stage three PA learning and JK tasks, 64 consonant-vowel-
consonant (CVC) nouns were chosen from the Noble (1961) norms to serve 
as stimulus terms. Semantic, and to a lesser degree, orthographic 
similarity was minimized. The nouns were all high in association value, 
ranging from 3.42 to 4.78 on the 0 to 5 point scale used by Noble. All 
were names of observable entities. The nouns were next divided into 
four groups of 16 with an attempt to minimize the number of words in 
each list which had the same first letters. Phonemic similarity was 
also minimized within each list. 
Response terms for the stage three tasks were 64 two-syllable nouns 
selected from the Paivio, Yuille, and Madigan (1968) norms. All words 
were of low frequency, occurring from 1 to 10 times per million English 
words (Thorndike & Lorge, 1944). Orthographic and semantic similarity 
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was minimized in the selection of these nouns. The entire range of 
imagery values was sampled so that four levels of imagery were defined, 
each level having 16 members. The nouns were then rank-ordered by 
imagery value. Each of the nouns in the first four positions became the 
first word in a different list, i.e., A, B, C, D. List· placement was 
then reversed for the second set of four nouns so that the fifth ranked 
noun was placed into List D, the sixth ranked noun into List C, etc. 
This alternation of list placement for every four imagery rankings pro-
duced approximately equal lists in terms of mean imagery values. The 
two-syllable nouns were then randomly paired with the CVC nouns in each 
of the four lists under the restrictions that no pair of words begin 
with the same letter and that obvious associations be eliminated. Five 
orders were created for each of the four lists. Four of the orders 
served as study and JK lists and one as the constant test list. The 
study and JK orders were formed under the restriction that the first two 
pairs in each order were not present in the final two positions of the 
preceding order. The test order for each list was randomly determined. 
However, the first two items in the test order were never present in 
the last two positions of any study and JK list. 
Four EL lists of 16 items each were formed from the four JK lists. 
To create an EL list', one item was randomly selected from each of the 
four imagery levels of every JK list. The EL lists were thus similar 
in imagery level among themselves and in relation to the JK lists. In 
each list, the first two items were always from the highest and lowest 
quartiles of response term imagery. On alternating lists, the first item 
was from the highest or lowest imagery level. Although there was only 
one internal order for each list, the permutations of the four lists 
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allowed 24 different orders of presentation. 
Lastly, 52 general information questions were constructed. These 
were intended to have answers which would be relatively difficult for 
first year college students to recall but which could be recognized 
since the information was of the kind likely to have been experienced 
previously. Care was taken to insure that the questions allowed plausi-
ble distractors in the recognition task. The areas of history, litera-
ture, natural science, art, sports, geography, and popular culture were 
sampled approximately equally. An example of a history question is: 
What Spaniard extensively explored the U.S. southwest? The alternatives 
, 
were: V. de Balboa, H. Cortes, H. de Soto, F. Coronado. No more than 
three questions from the same area followed each other contiguously. The 
recognition alternatives were arranged so that the correct answers 
appeared in each of the four positions equally often. 
Procedure 
As Table 1 indicates, the first task for half the subjects was 
the making of EL judgments on the word pairs which would later be 
learned as paired-associates. The ratings were made in a room different 
from that in which learning was later required. No slide projection 
equipment was present. To further the impression that different tasks 
would follow the making of EL ratings and bene~ to minimize attempts by 
subjects to study the items while making EL judgments, the testing room 
also contained stacks of mimeographed materials. The following in-
structions were read by the experimenter as the subject followed on his 
printed instructions. 
You are being asked to make what are called "Ease of Learning 
Judgments." That is, you will be given four sheets of paper. 
On each sheet are typed 16 pairs of words. You will be asked 
to picture a situation in which the 16 items on the list will be 
presented one pair at a time for study. You will also be asked 
to assume that you are going to study each pair of words so that 
later you can give the right-hand word to the cue of the left-
hand word. Each pair of words will be presented for only three 
seconds at a time. Then, after the entire list has been pre-
sented once, you will be given the left-hand word that is paired 
with each. As during ~he study period, you will only have three 
seconds to give the correct word. The pairs of words will then 
be presented again, but in a different order, and you will be 
asked to study the same words again. After this, there will be 
another test period. After many such study-test trials, you 
should be able to give all the right-hand words correctly. This 
then is the situation you are being asked to keep in the back of 
your mind. 
OK? Again, first you see two items and then only one and 
you are to give the second item. 
What you will be specifically asked to do is to make judgments 
about the speed with which you would learn the typed pairs of 
words in such a situation. That is, some pairs of words are 
rather easy to learn, while others are much harder to learn. For 
example, RED - PETAL is probably much easier to learn then RED -
XYLEM, even though both refer to parts of flowers. What we want 
you to do is to give your judgments about how easy or hard certain 
pairs of words would be for you to learn • 
. To make these judgments, you are asked to use the straight 
line which will be typed next to each word pair. Consider this 
line as a scale of learning difficulty in which the left-hand 
side indicates EASY to learn items and the right-hand side stands 
for HARD to learn items. Thus, for a pair of words like RED -
PETAL, you would probably put a mark somewhere on the left-hand 
side of the line. For a pair like RED - XYLEM, on the other hand, 
you would be more likely to put a mark somewhere on the right-
hand side of the line. That is, in making your ease of learning 
judgments, look at each word pair and try to see where they would 
fall along such a scale. If you think the word pair would be 
easy to learn, place a mark somewhere on the left-hand side of 
the scale; for a word pair that is hard to learn, put a mark 
further over to the right. 
Use as much or as little of the scale as you wish. 
Any questions? 
The subject was then handed four sheets of paper face-down. All 
were labeled "Ease of Learning Judgments." On each sheet were typed 16 
pairs of words downward along the left-hand margin. Next to each pair 
was a line which ran for six inches across t.he page. Above the first 
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line were the words EASY and HARD on the left and right ends of the line, 
respectively. Subjects self-paced their EL ratings, turning over one 
page at a time. As each sheet was completed, it was returned to the 
experimenter, who also recorded the time for each list. 
Group EL subjects were next taken to the experimental room. For 
Group NoEL subjects, who did not make EL judgments, all tasks occurred 
in the experimental room. All subjects were tested individually. 
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Stage two was a PA learning task. The stimulus terms were 16 
consonants and the response terms two-digit numbers. Subjects were 
given PA instructions for the study-test procedure. They were left to 
their own devices during the study trials and wrote down the appropriate 
numbers on unnumbered, lined answer sheets during the test trials. The 
16 pairs were presented via a slide projector at a 3-sec. rate with a 
3-sec. intertrial interval. There were five study-test cycles. No 
feedback was given. 
After a two minute rest interval, subjects were told that they 
would next be asked to learn some pairs of words in a manner similar to 
that used for the letter-number pairs. Group EL subjects were informed 
that these were the same word-pairs they had previously rated. Subjects 
were also asked to consider themselves in a game situation in which five 
points would be awarded for each correct ·response on the test trial and 
five points lost for each incorrect response. They were therefore asked 
to learn as many word-pairs as possible to maximize their point total. 
The words were presented for one study trial at a 3-sec. rate. 
Prior to the second presentation, subjects were handed a folded 
sheet of paper (Table 2). The portion of the paper which the subject 
first viewed was labeled "Judgment of Knowing." Beneath this was a six-
point scale on which NOT KNOWN WELL and KNOWN WELL were typed under-
TABLE 2 
Information given subjects regarding the game-point manipulation 
JUDGMENT OF KNOWING 
SCALE 
<:1 2 
NOT 
KNOWN 
WELL 
For each response word you recall: 
and 
BONUS or PENALTY based on JK accuracy: 
So. 
JK 1 
-3 
2 
-2 
3 
-1 
5 6> 
KNOWN 
WELL 
+5 points. 
4 
+1 
5 
+2 
6 
+3 
If you predict recall for a word and you do recall 
that word, you can get as many as 8 points. 
For each response word you do not recall: 
and 
BONUS or PENALTY based on JK accuracy: 
So. 
JK 1 
+3 
2 
+2 
3 
+1 
-s points. 
4 
-1 
5 
-2 
6 
-3 
If you predict that you will not recall a word and 
you do not recall that word, you may lose as few 
as 2 points. 
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neath the first and last three numbers, respectively. A straight line 
was present under the numbers 1-3 and its continuation under 4-6. Out-
ward pointing arrows were also present on both ends of each line to 
emphasize further the dichotomous nature of the scale. Subjects were 
then read the following instructions. 
You have now studied the entire list. The presentation after 
this one will be a test trial. However, before this test trial, 
you will see the list again and this time you will be asked to 
predict how likely you are to recall the response term on the 
test trial. 
That is, you are being asked to indicate how well you know 
each pair of words. You are being asked to make what we are 
calling a "Judgment of Knowing." Further, you are asked to make 
this judgment for each pair on the basis of a six-point scale. 
Thus, a judgment of knowing of 4, 5, or 6 should mean that you know 
the pair of words rather well and will probably be able to re-
call the right-hand word on the next trial, while a judgment of 
knowing of 3, 2, or 1 should mean that you do not know a particu-
lar word-pair well enough to recall the right-hand word on the 
next trial. OK? 
To help you to try to make these judgments as accurately as 
possible, remember again that you are in a game situation in 
which you will get five points for every word recalled and will 
lose five points for every word not recalled. Further, in this 
game, you will get bonus or penalty points for judgment of knowing 
accuracy. Please unfold your sheet of paper so that you may get 
a picture of the bonus-penalty point system. 
Note first that there are no more than three bonus or penalty 
points. Thus, if you predict recall for a word by giving a 
judgment of knowing of 4, 5, or 6 and you later recall the word, 
you will get one bonus point for a JK of 4, two bonus points for 
a JK of 5, and three bonus points for a previous JK of 6. How-
~' if you predict recall for a word and do not recall it::You 
will lose the same number of points--plus the automatic five 
points lost for not recalling a word. So, if you're not sure you 
know a pair well enough for later recall, your best bet is to 
write down 1, 2, or 3--at least then you will only lose a few 
points if you do not recall the word. But please remember that 
you are being asked to try to get as many points as possible. So 
try to be as exact as you can in your predictions. 
Also, since these words will be presented at the same rate as 
previously, try to write down your JK as quickly as possible for 
every item. 
The game-points instruction sheet was then replaced by a sheet of 
paper with lines and subjects were informed that they were to write down 
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their JK numbers on this paper. The same scale that had been in the top 
quarter of the instruction sheet (Table 2) was also on the top of the 
answer sheet. The test trial immediately followed the JK trial. Presen-
tation rates were the same on all trials, approximately 3-sec. for each 
item. A tape-recorded signal connected to the slide carousel projected 
each slide at the same rate. 
Subjects rested in the 3-min. interval between the first and 
second PA lists. After the experimenter calculated the subject's game-
points~ he informed the subject of his or her point total and asked the 
subject to try to improve JK accuracy on the next list and to get more 
points. To further motivate the subjects, the experimenter asked gen-
eral questions about how subjects were doing and suggested that the 
task would get easier. 
The same procedure was followed for the remaining three lists, 
. 
with a 3-min. interval between lists. However, there were no further 
interruptions between study and JK trials to explain the game-points 
manipulation or the JK. After being informed of their scores on the 
fourth list~ subjects were asked to make an appointment for the second 
session~ which occurred about a week after the first session. 
During the second session, subjects were given index cards on 
which were typed general information questions. They read each question 
aloud and attempted to answer it. Subjects were asked always to give 
an answer. However~ if resistance was offered to guessing regarding a 
question about which the subject was totally uninformed, the point was 
not pressed. If the answer was correct~ subjects were told so and the 
next card was presented. 
The lower portion of each question-containing index card contained 
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a six-point scale. The scale was similar to the JK scale but was label-
ed FEELING OF KNOloTING. CANNOT SELECT and CAN SELECT were typed under-
neath the numbers 1-3 and 4-6, respectively. After a subject's first 
incorrect answer, he was asked if he had any "feeling" of knowing the 
correct answer well enough so that he would be able to select the 
correct answer from among four alternatives. Subjects were asked first 
to think in terms of a dichotomous FK judgment and then to make finer 
distinctions. They were also reminded that the alternatives would be 
similar to the correct answer. Immediately after a subject gave a FK 
rating, the card with the question's four recognition alternatives was 
presented. The subject then indicated his selection, together with a 
second choice. It was emphasized that the first choice was the impor-
tant answer and that the second was mainly to verify the validity of 
alternatives. The subjects were allowed as much time as they wished for 
recall, FK judgments, and the recognition task. The experimenter kept 
a record of subjects' responses and informed subjects both regarding the 
accuracy of their choices and regarding the correct answer. 
Afterwards, subjects were informed of the basic details of the 
experiment. Subjects were also asked to sign release forms allowing 
the experimenter to examine their Scholastic Aptitude Test and/or Amer-
ican College Test scores. It was indicated that this was not necessary 
to get credit but would be helpful for the study. All subjects signed 
the release forms. 
Subjects 
A total of 48 Loyola undergraduates participated as subjects in 
this study in partial fulfillment of their introductory psychology 
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course requirements. All subjects were naive to FK and JK tasks. 
Assignment to the two conditions was alternated on the basis of appear-
ance in the laboratory. The data of three subjects could not be 
utilized due to experimenter error. 
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
Question 1. Accuracy, practice, and the Judgment of Knowing 
The initial question has two concerns. First, the JK must be 
evaluated with regard to its accuracy as a predictor of future recall 
performance. Secondly, the JK is to be observed over lists to determine 
if such predictive accuracy increases with practice. The two concer11s 
are considered for the JK both as a dichotomous measure and as a six-
point scale. 
Table 3 indicates terminology from signal-detection theory which 
will be employed in describing the data. The co~umns refer to the JK 
ratings which were given by subjects to the paired-associate items. 
Ratings which predicted nonrecall (1, 2, or 3) are symbolized by JK; 
ratings which predicted recall (4, 5, or 6) by JK. The rows distinguish 
items as either recalled or nonrecalled. Four joint events are thus 
possible. If item recall followed a prediction of 1, 2, or 3, the item 
is scored as a Miss. That is, the recall of an item rated 1, 2, or 3 
indicated a previous failure to assess an item's future recallability. 
However, if nonrecall followed a prediction of 1, 2, or 3, such a correct 
expectation of an item's future nonrecall is labeled a Correct Rejection. 
--S,im;flarly, _if item recall occurred after a rating of 4, 5, or 6, this 
accurate prediction of an item's future recall is considered a Hit. 
However, if a JK rating of 4, 5, or 6 was followed by nonrecall, this is 
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TABLE 3 
Terminology from signal detection theory as applied to JK accuracy 
JK = 1, 2, 3 JK = 4, 5, 6 
Item Recall Miss Hit 
Item Nonrecall Correct Rejection False Alarm 
called a False Alarm because the item was incorrectly evaluated as re-
callable. 
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Originally, the appropriate measure to evaluate JK accuracy and its 
improvement over lists was considered to be that used by Hart (1965, 
1967a, 1967b) and Blake (1973) to assess FK accuracy. Recall probabil-
ities for items given JK ratings of 1, 2, or 3 (Miss proportions) were 
to have been subtracted from recall probabilities for items given ratings 
of 4, 5, or 6 (Hit proportions). The JK was to be considered a valid 
predictor of future performance if recall followed positive JK ratings 
more than negative JK ratings. 
However, this measure can be shown to be a misleading index of 
performance when Hit or Miss proportions are based on a small number of 
instances. As examples, consider the actual data in Table 4. When the 
accuracy measure is the difference between Hit and Miss proportions, 
Subject A's performance on Lists 3 and 4 is seen to vary greatly. How-
ever, the .43 increase in sensitivity from -.07 to .36 is mainly due to 
the one item change in the Miss proportions, from 2/2 to 1/2. Similarly, 
Subject B's change in JK accuracy from .94 on List 3 to .00 on List 4 
results principally from the two erroneous predictions of nonrecall on 
the last list. Since 39 of the 48 subjects had at least one of their 
eight listwise proportions based on 4, 3, 2, or 1 instances, the Hit 
less Miss measure would seem to imply more listwise variability within 
subjects than is present in the data. 
The proportion measure likewise accentuates variability between 
subjects with respect to overall JK accuracy. For example, Subjects A 
and B in Table 4 have identical Hit proportions. Yet, a difference of 
three Miss items places Subject A at the 11th percentile and Subject B 
TABLE 4 
Comparisons of relative (JK Accuracy) and absolute (JK Errors) 
measures of JK sensitivity 
Subject A. 
Hit - Miss JK Accuracy JK Errors 
List 1. 12/12 - 4/4 = 1.00 - 1.00 = .00 4 
List 2. 11/12 - 3/4 = .92 - .75 = .17 4 
List 3. 13/14 - 2/2 = • 93 - 1.00 = -.07 3 
List 4. 12/14 - 1/2 = .86 - .50 = .36 3 
Overall 48/52 - 10/12 = .92 - .83 = .09 14 
Subj.ect B. 
Hit - Miss JK Accuracy JK Errors 
List 1. 10/12 - 1/4 = .83 - .25 = .58 3 
List 2. 9/10 - 4/6 = .90 - • 67 = .23 5 
List 3. 15/16 - 0 = .94 - 0 = .94 1 
List 4. 14/14 - 2/2 = 1.00 - 1.00 = .00 2 
Overall 48/52 - 7/12 = .92 - .58 = • 34 11 
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at the 57th percentile when the 48 overall accuracy scores are evaluated 
by comparisons of Hit and Miss proportions. 
To examine JK accuracy and its improvement over list~ while avoid-
ing the above statistical problem, the present research will utilize 
measures of sensitivity and criterion change whi~h were employed by 
Underwood (1974) to compare recognition memory and frequency judgment 
tasks. The measure of sensitivity is the sum of a subject's erroneous 
predictions, Misses plus False Alarms. Because this measure is based 
on absolute numbers rather than on proportions, it is not overly in-
fluenced by a small number of instances in either JK or JK categories. 
As can be seen in the last two columns of Table 4, number of JK 
errors as a measure of subjective sensitivity leads to less ambiguous 
descriptions of performance in the present task than does the difference 
between Hit and Miss proportions. Whereas the proportion measures led 
to accuracy scores of -.07 and .36 on Lists 3 and 4 for Subject A, 
number of JK errors as a measure of sensitivity interprets the two lists 
as both involving three JK errors. Interlist differences are similarly 
minimized for Subject B on Lists 3 and 4. While the measures based on 
proportions led to accuracy scores of .94 and .00 on Lists 3 and 4, 
number of JK errors describes the two lists as having one and two errors, 
respectively. 
The measure which reflects changes in the criteria that subjects 
used in predicting their future recall performance will be the differ-
ence in error types divided by their sum, Miss - False Al~rm/Miss + False 
Alarm. A positive proportion thus indicates a bias toward predicting 
nonrecall; a negative proportion a bias toward predicting recall. 
The JK ~~dichotomous measure. Three comparisons were performed 
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to establish the general adequacy of the dichotomous JK as an accurate 
predictor of future recall performance. To establish the overall 
accuracy of the JK, the total number of right and wrong predictions were 
compared. That is, Misses and Correct Rejections were subtracted from 
Hits and False Alarms for each subject. The resultant difference is 
the standard correction for guessing in a two-alternative, forced-choice 
situation. Thus, the average subject made 45.3 correct predictions. 
This is significantly greater than the average 18.7 incorrect predic-
tions, ~(47, two-tailed) = 16.51, £ <.001. 
A further examination of JK accuracy is the difference between 
mean Hit (.75) and Miss (.46) proportions. Although the two components 
have faults as descriptive measures for the present research, the 
difference is highly reliable, ~(47, two-tailed) = 8.35, £ <.001. 
To evaluate the separate adequacies of positive and negative JK 
ratings, probabilities of recall and nonrecall conditional on a predic-
tion of recall (Hit) or nonrecall (Correct Rejection) were compared with 
the actual probabilities as chance expectations. Of the 39.0 items for 
which the average subject predicted recall, 31.1 (80%) were actually 
recalled. Mean recall, however, was only 41.8 (65%) of the 64 items. 
The z-score difference between the conditional and expected recall pro-
portions was 2.19, £ <.05. Similarly, the average subject predicted 
nonrecall for 25.0 items. Of these items, 14.2 (57%) were correct 
predictions. The z-score difference between this conditional nonrecall 
probability and the actual nonrecall probability of .35 was 3.21, £ <.01. 
Subjects would seem to have made predictions of both recall and non-
recall with an accuracy greater than the chance expectations. 
The second concern regarding the dichotomous JK is the estimation 
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of the effects of practice on its sensitivity and bias. To examine the 
effect of practice on JK sensitivity, the mean number of JK errors 
(Misses and False Alarms) per list per subject was first analyzed by a 
2 X 4 ANOVA in which the first factor was EL judgment (presence or 
absence) and the second factor was Lists. The means for this comparison 
(collapsed across the EL judgment variable) are given in the JK Errors 
column of Table 5. The main effect of EL judgment was significant, 
F (1,46) = 6.76, ~ <.05. Subjects who did not make EL judgments gave 
reliably less erroneous JK predictions than did subjects who had previ-
ously made EL judgments. Of more importance, however, was the signi-
ficant main effect of Lists, F (3, 138) = 4.97, ~ <.01. Measured by the 
number of errors, subjective sensitivity at the JK task can be said to 
have increased with practice. The interaction was not significant. 
The decrease in JK errors over lists (5.60, 4.67, 4.46, 3.96) was 
also analyzed for linear trend. The linear component was found reliable 
F (1,46) = 13.55, ~ <.01. 
· To determine if practice led subjects to change the criteria 
governing their predictions, the Miss - False Alarm/Miss+ False Alarm 
bias ratios were examined via a 2 X 4 ANOVA in which EL judgment 
(presence or absence) and Lists were factors. Neither the main effect 
of EL judgment nor its interaction with Lists~ significant, both F's 
<1. However, the main effect of Lists was reliab1e, F (3, 138) • 11.45, 
~ <.01. As can be gleaned from the last column im Table 5, errors on 
the first list tended to be underpredictions of recall. To examine the 
temporal course of the reversal tendency which began on the second list, 
each subject's number of Miss and False Alarm errors per list was 
analyzed via a 2 X 4 ANOVA in which JK Error Type (False Alarms and 
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TABLE 5 
Mean performance per subject relevant to the evaluation of the 
sensitivity and bias of the dichotomous JK 
All Subjects: 
" 
M-FA 
List Hits - FAs* = Pos. Ace. CRs - Misses = Neg. Ace. JK Errors M+FA 
1 6.25 - 1.27 = 4.98 4.15 - 4.33 = 
2 7.88- 2.12 = 5.76 3.46 - 2.54 = 
3 8.23 - 2.38 = 5.85 3.31 - 2.08 = 
4 8.73- 2.15 = 6.58 3.33 - 1. 79 = 
M-FA 
Group EL: JK Errors M+FA Group NoEL: 
List 1 6.04 .56 
List 2 5.37 .07 
List 3 4.88 -.13 
List 4 4.38 -.14 
* FAs = False Alarms 
Pos. Ace. = JK Positive Accuracy 
CRs = Correct Rejections 
Neg. Ace. = JK Negative Accuracy 
List 1 
List 2 
List 3 
List 4 
-.18 
.92 
1.23 
1.54 
JK Errors 
5.17 
3.96 
4.04 
3.54 
M-FA/M+FA = Miss - False Alarm/Miss + False Alarm 
5.60 .54 
4.67 .15 
4.46 -.05 
3.96 -.09 
M-FA 
M+FA 
.52 
• 23 
.04 
-.04 
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Misses) and Lists were factors. The effect of major importance was the 
significant JK Error Type X Lists interaction, F (3, 138) = 14.24, E <.01. 
(The mean values are found under the two headings in Table 5.) When the 
difference between the two types of errors was next examined by simple 
effects analyses for each list, the difference was found reliable for 
the first and second lists, F's >10.99, but not for the last two lists, 
both F's <1. Thus, the decrease over lists in the overall number of 
errors was accompanied by a change from an initial bias towards errone-
ous predictions of nonrecall to an eventual impartiality of erroneous 
judgments of knowing. 
To determine the locus of improvement, the effect of practice was 
also analyzed separately for predictions of recall and nonrecall. (Such 
analyses, of course, must be viewed with caution because repeated 
analyses of the same data increase the probability of a significant 
effect due to chance alone.) To control for the differential frequen-
cies of use of the two predictions, the depen~t measure was again 
formed by the standard correction for guessing in a two alternative 
forced-choice situation: right less wrong for each type of prediction. 
The means of the corrected predictions of recall (JK Positive Accuracy) 
and nonrecall (JK Negative Accuracy) are given in the third and sixth 
columns of Table 5. These are each preceded by ~ir components. 
To analyze positive JK predictions, a 2 X 4 X 2 ANOVA was performed 
in which the first two factors were EL judgments (presence or absence) 
and Lists. The third facto~ consisted of ~o_dependent measures, namely, 
each subject's number of Hits and False Alarms. lt was named JK Posi-
tive Accuracy. The main effect of JK Positive Accuracy was significant, 
F (1, 46) = 20.75, E <.01. The greater number of Hits than False Alarms 
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per subject replicates the earlier finding of the adequacy of the posi-
tive JK as a predictor of recall. However, although the increase in 
Hits over lists was slightly more rapid than the increase in False 
Alarms, this interaction was not reliable, F (3, 118) = 2.04. Thus, 
practice cannot be said to have led to increased accuracy regarding 
the positive JK. The other interactions were also not significant. 
The listwise course of positive JK ratings may also be expressed 
in terms of proportions of Hits to predictions of recall. The slight 
decrease over lists (.83, .79, .78, .80) would seem to indicate that 
the bias against positive predictions on the first list set limits on 
relative improvement in positive judgments of knowing. 
To examine the effect of practice on negative JK predictions, a 
2 X 4 X 2 ANOVA was next performed in which the first two factors were 
EL judgments (presence or absence) and Lists. The third factor was 
labeled JK Negative Accuracy because it consisted of the two dependent 
measures Correct Rejections and Misses. The mean performance per sub-
ject is found in Table 5. The significance of the main effect of JK 
Negative Accuracy, F (1, 46) = 4.35, £ <.OS, may be interpreted to in-
dicate that negative JK ratings are somewhat accurate predictors of 
nonrecall. Of more importance is the significant Lists X JK Negative 
Accuracy interaction, F (3, 138) = 4.37, £ <.01. Although negative pre-
dictions occurred less often with practice, the decrease in the number 
of Correct Rejections was much less rapid than the decrease in the number 
of Misses. Expressed as the ratio of Correct Rejections to the number 
of negative JK predictions, the listwise probabilities of accurate nega-
tive JK predictions are .49, .58, .61, .65. For the dichotomous JK, 
then, the major effect of practice would seem to be this improvement in 
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predicting nonrecall. 
Consideration may also be given to the finding that the NoEL group 
made significantly less erroneous predictions than the EL group, 16.7 
versus 20.7 JK Errors. The Group NoEL superiority over Group EL was 
similar for both types of errors (~'s = 1.37 and 1.39 for False Alarms 
and Misses, respectively). 
The cause of such a difference may be theorized to be some inter-
ference stemming from the familiarization inherent in the EL task. 
However, other interpretations must first be discounted. Thus, the 
number of correct recalls in the five-trial letter-number task was com-
pared for groups EL and NoEL. The nonsignificant difference, ~ <1, 
would seem to indicate that NoEL superiority is not related to general 
learning ability as defined by letter-number performance. The differ-
ence was also not obviously related to the level of recall on the JK 
lists. When number of recalls per list were submitted to a 2 X 4 ANOVA 
in which EL judgments (presence or absence) and Lists were factors, 
neither the main effect of EL judgment, F <1, nor its interaction with 
Lists, F = 1.47, was significant. The level of recall was also found 
not to change over the four lists, F <1. Differences in sensitivity 
between the EL and NoEL subjects will be further observed when the JK 
is examined as a six-point scale. 
The JK ~~six-point scale. The second series of analyses of JK 
accuracy will focus on the full JK scale. Figure 1 contains the recall 
probabilities for the JK scale values on the four lists. In complement, 
Table 6 presents the number of recalls for each JK scale position in 
relation to the frequency of usage of each scale position. With only 
one exception in four lists, the recall probabilities can be seen to 
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Figure 1. Recall proportions for JK scale values 9n four lists. 
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TABLE 6 
Recall proportions for JK scale values on four lists 
JK Values 
List 1 2 3 4 5 6 
49 = 62 = 97 = 113 = 69 = 118 = 
1 105 .47 141 .44 161 .60 145 .78 85 .81 131 .90 
17 = 38 = 68 = 135 = 102 = 141 = 
2 73 .23 90 .42 125 .54 193 .70 127 .80 160 .88 
24 = 31 = 45 = 109 = 98 = 188 = 
3 75 .32 85 .36 99 .45 170 .64 128 .77 211 .89 
13 = 18 = 56 = 96 = 95 = 228 = 
4 61 .21 68 .26 117 .48 155 .62 116 .82 251 .91 
103 = 149 = 266 = 453 = 364 = 675 = 
Sum 314 .33 384 .39 502 .53 663 .68 456 .80 753 .90 
increase as JK ratings increase. 
Examination of performance on the individual scale positions in-
dicates that the recall probabilities for items with JK ratings of 6 
or 5 are initially very high and change little over the four lists. 
Moreover, Table 6 indicates that such accuracy occurs in the context of 
a considerably increased usage of these ratings. The recall probabili-
ties for the JK scale position of 4, however, show a rather consistent 
decrease over the four lists. Still, on every list, recall for items 
rated 4 is higher than recall for items rated 3. 
Scale usage predicting nonrecall is also very accurate. The 
recall proportions for items given JK ratings of 1, 2, and 3 generally 
decrease over lists. Again, Table 6 points out that such improvement 
occurs while the number of items receiving these ratings also declines 
regularly. Practice would thus seem to allow subjects to identify min-
imally learned items more accurately. 
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To determine if the six-point JK scale was an accurate instrument 
for predicting recall performance, the data considered were those on 
the bottom line of Table 6. If the first three proportions are each 
subtracted from unity, the results are probabilities of nonrecall con-
ditional on predictions of nonrecall. When these proportions (.67, .61, 
.47) are assessed against the actual nonrecall proportion of .35, the 
resulting ~-scores for the JK ratings of 1 and 2 (z's = 4.32 and 3.80, 
~ <.001) indicate that the first two scale points were more accurate 
predictors of nonrecall than the chance expectation. The difference for 
the JK rating of 3, however, failed to reach acceptable levels of sig-
nificance,~= 1.75. Yet, the trends of the proportions over lists were 
in the appropriate direction. Likewise, the recall probabilities for 
the three positive JK ratings (.68, .80, .90) were compared with the 
actual recall proportion of .65. Ratings of 6 and 5 were found to be 
more accurate than the expectation, ~ = 3.59, ~ <.01 and~= 2.16, 
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~ <.05, respectively. The JK rating of 4, however, was no more accurate 
a predictor of recall than the expectation, ~ = .43. Indeed, the trend 
over lists was for the accuracy of this prediction to decrease. Except 
for the JK rating of 4, then, the individual JK scale values would seem 
to be rather accurate indicators of future recall performance. 
In testing for improvement in JK accuracy over lists, examinations 
were made which weighted usage of the extreme JK scale positions more 
than usage of the middle scale points. This reflects the approach 
subjects were asked to take in making their JK ratings. Thus, recall 
after JK ratings of 3, 2, 1 and nonrecall after ratings of 4, 5, 6 was 
scored as 1, 2, and 3 negative game-points, respectively. Likewise, 
rec~ll after JK ratings of 4, 5, 6 and nonrecall after ratings of 3, 2, 
1 was scored as 1, 2, or 3 positive game-points, respectively. Table 7 
contains the mean scores per subject for negative game-points, positive 
game-points, and the components of each. 
Analyses of JK performance in terms of game-points generally val-
idated previous findings with the number of dichotomous JK errors. 
Sensitivity as measured by a decrease in negative game-points was found 
to increase with practice, F (3, 138) = 5.24, ~ <.01. Practice also 
led to changes in the Miss - False Alarm/Miss + False Alarm bias ratio 
when each type of error was weighted in terms of the game-points involved. 
After an initial predominance of negative game-points for underpredic-
tions of recall on List 1, subjects were found to lose an equal number 
of game-points for the two types of errors on Lists 2, 3, and 4 (!'s <2.56 
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TABLE 7 
JK performance scored as negative game-points, positive game-points, 
and their components: Mean game-points per subject. 
All Subjects: 
Negative Positive 
Game- Game- M-FA 
points • FAs* + Misses points = Hits + CRs M+FA 
List 1 9.81 = 2.15 + 7.67 20.79 = 12.60 + 8.19 .55 
List 2 7.52 = 3.44 + 4.08 22.71 
-
15.88 + 6.83 .16 
List 3 7.69 = 3.96 + 3.73 24.67 = 18.10 + 6.56 -.04 
List 4 6.27 = 3.54 + 2.73 26.42 = 20.21 + 6.35 -.11 
Group EL: Negative Positive Group NoEL: Negative Positive 
Game- Game- Game- Game-
points points points points 
List 1 10.50 18.71 List.1 9.12 22.88 
List 2 8.50 20.00 List 2 6.54 25.42 
List 3 7.83 22.46 List 3 7.54 26.88 
List 4 6.21 24.67 List 4 6.33 28.17 
*FAs = False Alarms 
CRs = Correct Rejections 
M-FA/M+FA = Miss - False Alarm/Miss + False Alarm 
-----
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in simple effects analyses). Thirdly, separate examinations indicated 
that both predictions of recall and of nonrecall involved more positive 
than negative game-points, F's = 91.61 and 7.30, respectively. Further, 
while game-points for predictions of nonrecall decreased over lists for 
both incorrect and correct predictions (cf. columns 3 and 6 in Table 7), 
the decrease was much less for Correct Rejections than for Misses, 
F (3, 138) = 3.25, ~ <.05. This replicates the earlier finding that 
predictions of nonrecall become more accurate with practice. 
Two important differences were also found between analyses based 
on game-points and those based on the dichotomous JK. A first differ-
ence was discovered when the listwise course of positive JK predictions 
was examined. A 2 X 4 X 2 ANOVA was performed in which the factors were 
EL judgments (presence or absence), Lists, and Positive Game-point 
Accuracy (Game-points for Hit items or for False Alarm items). The 
means are presented in the fifth and second columns of Table 7. Of most 
importance is the significant Lists X Positive Game-point Accuracy 
interaction, F (1, 46) = 7.26, ~ <.05. Game-points gained for Hit items 
increased more rapidly than did game-points lost for False Alarm items. 
With practice, greater confidence was expressed in the positive predic-
tions which were eventually followed by recall than in eventually dis-
proven positive predictions. When the listwise progression of the four 
item types is considered (cf. Table 7), the magnitude of this increase 
in game-points for Hit items is seen as the most striking effect of 
practice. 
A second difference between the two analyses was the finding that 
the lesser number of game-point errors for Group NoEL relative to Group 
EL was not reliable, F = 1.55. Thus, the smaller number of dichotomous 
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JK errors for Group NoEL did not lead to an appreciably lower number of 
game-point errors. Stated differently, the mean number of game-points 
lost for an erroneous JK item.was slightly greater for a subject from 
Group NoEL than for a subject from Group EL. 
It is thus possible that subjects who have had no experience with 
stimuli are thereby able to express more confident judgments of knowing 
than can subjects who have had greater familiarity with the items. This 
leads to the expectation that Group NoEL will prove superior to Group 
EL regarding the number of positive game-points gained. The number 
of positive game-points per subject per list was therefore analyzed by 
a 2 X 4 ANOVA in which EL judgments {presence or absence) and Lists 
were factors. The number of positive game-points was found to increase 
reliably over lists, F (3, 138) = 9.89, £ <.01. More importantly for 
the present hypothesis, the NoEL group was found to have gained more 
positive game-points than the EL group, F (1, 46) = 5.54, £ <.05. The 
interaction was not significant, F <1, the means indicating that the 
difference between the two groups was present from the first list. 
Increments in situational frequency from the EL task may thus be inter-
preted to have led to both less accuracy and less confidence in judgments 
of knowing by the EL group. 
That such Group NoEL superiority over Group EL is related to 
specific ratings rather than to any general response bias was strengthened 
when each subject's mean JK rating per list was submitted to a 2 X 4 
ANOVA in which EL judgments {presence or absence) and Li~~~ were factors. 
Although the increase in the mean JK over lists was reliable, F (3, 138) = 
18.93, ~ <.01, neither the main effect of EL judgments nor its inter-
action with Lists was significant, both F's <1. For Group NoEL 
superiority to exist under such group equality in scale usage would 
seem to require a rather sensitive assignment of the JK ratings. 
The examination of the full JK scale has thus confirmed the main 
results found with the JK as a dichotomous predictor of future perfor-
mance. The previously uncovered inability of practice to increase re-
liably the accuracy of positive JK predictions was also clarified by 
the finding that practice did lead to the expression of much greater 
confidence in the future recall of eventual Hit items. Lastly, this 
analysis also has offered the possibility that involvement with to be 
learned stimuli prior to a JK task increases the difficulty of later 
distinguishing recallable from nonrecallable items. 
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guestion 2. The EL judgment and the Judgment of Knowing 
The second question examines the relationship between ease of 
learning judgments and judgments of knowing made on the same items. The 
relationship will first be studied in terms of the individual correla-
tions between the EL and JK ratings for each subject in Group EL, both 
as overall and as listwise measures. This concern will also be observed 
with the data collapsed over subjects. 
The second comparison of EL and JK ratings will involve their 
separate adequacies as predictors of recall performance. Both individ-
ual and group data will be included. 
Lastly, two secondary analyses will be discussed. The first con-
trasts JK predictive accuracies when JK ratings are similar to earlier 
EL ratings with JK accuracies when the two ratings are dissimilar. The 
second inquires into the relationship between JK ratings and the stim-
ulus characteristics of imagery and recallability. 
Correlations between EL and JK ratings ~ individuals and ~ 
groups. For each subject in Group EL, Pearson and Spearman correlations 
were calculated between EL judgments and judgme~s of knowing on the 
same items. The EL judgment values were based aa the distance in milli-
meters from the end position of the EL scale. !able 8 presents measures 
of central tendency for the correlations between lL and JK ratings. 
The four lists are considered both separately •nd as an overall list. 
The mean overall Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient 
for the 24 subjects is .32. If this were an iudividual correlation 
coefficient for 64 pairs of items, the value would be reliably differ-
ent from zero, ~ <.01. The mean overall Spearman rank-order correlation 
coefficient is .30. An individual correlation of this size would not be 
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TABLE 8 
Measures of central tendency for EL and JK correlations* 
List 1 List 2 List 3 List 4 OVERALL 
** Mean .34 (.32) .32 (. 29) .39 (.35) .30 (.26) .32 (.30) 
Median .42 (.32) .38 (.34) .37 (. 29) .35 (.30) .34 (.33) 
Range -.15 to .84 -.28 to .77 .05 to .74 -.32 to .66 .04 to .60 
(-.18 to .84) (-.37 to .85) (-.08 to .71) (-.51 to .70) (-.08 to .62) 
* The data are individual correlations for 24 subjects. 
** The correlation coefficient outside the parentheses is the Pearson 
product-moment correlation coefficient; that within the parentheses 
is the Spearman rank-order correlation cqefficient. 
For an individual subject on a single list, significance at the .05 
and .01 levels requires Pearson correlation coefficients of .50 and 
.62 or Spearman correlation coefficients of .54 and .68, respectively. 
For an individual subject on all 64 items, significance at the .OS 
and .01 levels requires Pearson correlation coefficients of .25 and 
.32 or Spearman correlation coefficients of .36 and .47, respectively. 
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reliably different from zero, E <.10. The overall median values of 
both coefficients are slightly greater than the mean values, .34 and .33 
for Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients, respectively. There 
would seem to be a moderate relationship between individuals' EL and 
JK ratings. 
Over lists, the trend for the mean Pearson correlation coefficient 
is a slight decrease (.34, .32, .39, .30). The decrease is seen as more 
monotonic when the listwise course is described by changes in the median 
values of the Pearson coefficients (.42, .38, .37, .35). Spearman values 
are similar. Neither of these measures indicates a substantial or sig-
nificant change in the EL and JK relationship over lists. 
However, it is possible that the wide range present among the 
correlations may have led to measures of central tendency which greatly 
obscure listwise differences between the correlations for individual 
subjects. Therefore, the subjects were divided into high and low groups 
based on the strength of their EL-JK correlations on the first list. 
The correlations then served as data in a 2 X 4 ANOVA in which Correla-
tion Level (high or low) and Lists were factors. The Correlation Level 
X Lists interaction proved significant, F (3, 66) = 5.88, E <.01. The 
initially higher correlations decreased monotonically over lists (.59, 
.50, .43, .38), while the initially lower correlations tended to in-
crease with practice (.09, .14, .35, .23). It is, of course, plausible 
that such changes are merely a regression artifact. However, the inter-
action did occur while the variance of indiv.idual subjects' JK ratings 
decreased reliably over lists, F (3, 69) = 5.05. £ <.01. The tendency 
for all subjects to give higher JK ratings with practice, together with 
the trend for fast learners to utilize the higher JK scales dispropor-
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tionately over lists, seem to have been causal factors. 
Because the previous correlations for each list were based on only 
16 items per subject, it is possible that some were disproportionately 
influenced by a few extreme scores. This same influence also appears to 
have been present in some scatterplots of even overall data. To mini-
mize the role of extreme ratings in EL-JK comparisons, then, a new 
series of analyses was performed in which the EL scale was considered 
as a six-point, equal-interval scale. Specifically, it was assumed that 
subjects' EL ratings were dichotomous judgments and their adequacy as 
dichotomous predictors of JK ratings was evaluated. For example, an EL 
judgment of 4 was considered an accurate predictor of the item's later 
JK rating if the subject's JK rating for that item was 4, 5, or 6. How-
ever, if the item's JK rating was 3, 2, or 1, the EL judgment was con-
sidered an inaccurate predictor. The interpretations of such relation-
ships are similar to those of EL-JK correlations. 
Overall comparisons will be considered first. For the 64 EL 
predictions of JK ratings, the average subject was found to make 27.4 
errors. EL ratings as dichotomously predictive of JK ratings for the 
same items, then, involve a mean error proportion of .43. When this 
mean error proportion was compared with a .SO probability of success-
failure, the two proportions were found to be not reliably different, 
z = 1.11. When extreme values can have no disproportionate influence on 
the strength of the EL-JK relationship, then, a subject's dichotomous EL 
rating is not a reliably accurate predictor of the later ~K for the same 
item--at least when the items are considered without regard to list. 
The number of erroneous EL predictions of JK ratings was next 
considered on a listwise basis. The mean number of such EL-JK errors 
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was found to increase with practice (5.88, 7.12, 7.25, 7.17). However, 
this was not reliable, F (3, 69) = 1.62. The nonsignificant difference 
was thought to have resulted from the wide listwise variability within 
subjects in the number of erroneous EL-JK predictions. 
To examine this variability directly, the subjects were next 
divided on the basis of their number of erroneous EL predictions of JK 
ratings on List 1. This variable may be labeled EL-JK Errors and has 
the values high and low. The listwise progress of this variable was 
analyzed by a 2 X 4 ANOVA. The EL-JK Errors X Lists interaction was 
found to be significant, F (3, 66) = 5.88, E <.01. The change over 
lists was mainly due to an increase in the number of EL-JK errors by 
subjects whose List 1 JK ratings had been rather accurately predicted 
by dichotomous EL ratings (3.58, 7.17, 6.50, 6.00 EL-JK errors over lists). 
Subjects whose early JK ratings were poorly predicted by their EL ratings 
tended to have EL-JK errors at the chance level on all four lists (8.17, 
7.08, 8.08, 8.08). It thus appears that the easy-hard dichotomy re-
flected in EL judgments is never a dominant factor in some subjects' 
judgments of knowing. Similarly, the strong early similarity between 
EL judgments and JK ratings is soon diminished for the other subjects. 
A potential objection to the above analyses regarding the dichoto-
mous prediction of JK ratings by EL ratings might question whether an 
EL rating of 3 or 4 is correctly considered erroneous if it is followed 
by a JK rating of 4 or 3. However, on the first list where there is no 
influence from past experience, 55% of the EL values of 3 and 4 correct-
ly predicted their respective JK ratings. This proportion is only 
slightly less than the 58% correct proportion for JK values of 3 or 4 
when these predicted recall performance on the first list. It may also 
be mentioned that, over the four lists, EL-JK errors of only one scale 
position accounted for only 19%, 22%, 18%, and 14% of the total number 
of EL-JK errors. In sum, then, this objection does not seem valid. 
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The data from the predictive accuracy of dichotomous EL judgments 
in respect to later JK ratings do not deny the previous finding of some 
relation between the EL and JK ratings of the same subjects. However, 
the dichotomous data indicate that the relationship is stronger in terms 
of the full EL and JK scales than in terms of the dichotomous scales. 
Stated differently, some items should seem to be more influential in 
the EL-JK relationship than others. Such items are not allowed to have 
a greater import when the scales are dichotomous. Further, when the 
influence of relatively extreme items is eliminated by usage of a dichot-
omous scale, the listwise course for some subjects would seem to be no 
EL-JK relationship while for others the relationship becomes weaker. 
The EL-JK relationship was also investigated with data from group 
means. When the mean EL values for each item were correlated with Group 
EL's mean JK rating for the same item, the correlation was found to be 
.80. This is much higher than the mean individual overall EL-JK corre-
lation (.32) and is even greater than the strongest individual overall 
correlation (.68). The above-mentioned strong influence of some items 
in the correlation would seem to be validated. Further, evidence is 
also offered for an idiosyncratic component in the individual EL-JK 
correlations. Such idiosyncrycity is likewise attested to by a drop in 
the EL-JK correlation (from .80 to .68) when the mean JK values are those 
of Group NoEL. 
Predictions of recall performance~ EL ~ JK ratings. A second 
EL and JK comparison involves the evaluation of their individual valid-
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ities as predictors of recall performance. This concern is not with EL 
accuracy in itself. Recall or nonrecall after only one study trial may 
not be an adequate test of the accuracy of an EL prediction. However, 
if JK ratings were made on the same basis as that underlying the origin-
al EL ratings, the JK accuracy values ought to be similar to those for 
the EL ratings. Such comparisons are presented for both individual and 
group data. The same information also allows further comparisons of the 
effect of an EL task on later JK accuracy. 
Each subject's ELand JK ratings were first compared as predictors 
of recall performance by individual biserial correlations. Table 9 
contains measures of central tendency for the biserial correlation co-
efficients which were run for each Group EL subject on both the overall 
data and on the separate lists. 
When the overall data are considered, two relationships are 
prom~nent. First, for Group EL, the mean value of the correlation be-
tween EL ratings and predictions of recall-nonrec~l (.26) is weaker 
than the mean value of the biserial correlation between JK ratings and 
predictions of recall-nonrecall (.38). The diffeiDence is greater when 
the central tendency of the individual correlatioms is described by 
median values, .22 for the EL-recall performance end .44 for the JK-
recall performance correlations. Secondly, the mean JK-recall perfor-
mance correlation value (.47) for Group NoEL is gD!ater than either of 
the two correlations mentioned for Group EL. 
However, such overall data involve a JK which may be influenced 
by feedback as to its accuracy plus other treatment differences relative 
to the EL judgment. To compare actual JK ace.uracy when feedback is not 
present with the expected accuracy if the basis fer the JK were that 
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TABLE 9 
Measures of central tendency for biserial correlations 
between EL and JK ratings and recall performance 
Group EL: EL ratings and Recall-Nonrecall performance. 
List 1 List 2 List 3 List 4 OVERALL 
Mean .23* • 23 • 25 .30 .26 
Med;lan .30 .26 .21 • 35 .22 
Range -.33 to .66 -.24 to .62 -.28 to .78 -.94 to .84 
-·16 to .59 
Group EL: JK ratings and Recall-Nonrecall performance. 
List 1 List 2 List 3 List 4 OVERALL 
Mean .36 .46 .52 .43 .38 
Median .40 .48 .58 .43 .44 
Range -.42 to 1.11** .oo to 1.10 -.60 to 1. 04 -.24 to 1.14 -.23 to .78 
Group NoEL: JK ratings and Recall-Nonrecall performance. 
List 1 List 2 List 3 List 4 OVERALL 
Mean .59 • 55 .50 .56 .47 
Median • 64 .67 .55 .67 .51 
Range -.26 to 1.09 -.38 to 1. 01 -.33 to 1.06 -.48 to 1.05 -.26 to .78 
* For an individual subject on a single list, significance at the .05 
and .01 levels requires biserial correlation coefficients of .50 and 
.62, respectively. 
For an individual subject on all 64 items, significance at the .05 and 
.01 levels requires biserial coefficients of .2j and .32, respectively. 
** The biserial correlation coefficient may be greatter than 1.00. 
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which underlay EL ratings, List 1 performance may be observed via 
biserial correlations. For such a comparison, factors which may non-
differentially facilitate the JK need not be distinguished from the JK. 
However, differences which may have had a negative influence on only 
EL ratings must be considered. Such differences may be that the EL 
ratings involved the entire list, that they were self-paced, and that 
their accuracy was assessed after a longer interval than that present 
for JK ratings. 
However, the listwise experience can be expected to have led to 
more sophisticated scale usage by subjects making EL judgments. Similar-
ly, time at the EL task was only slightly related to the number of 
errors with dichotomous EL predictions of recall performance (r = .16). 
This contrasts with the stronger and facilitative (r = -.29) effect of 
time at the EL task and number of JK errors. Lastly, since the EL judg-
ment·was meant to elicit relatively stable subjective estimates of item 
difficulty, a test of EL accuracy which occurs within minutes may be 
considered adequate. 
When the accuracy of EL and JK ratings is assessed by mean biserial 
correlations on the first list, the same ordering is found as with 
overall correlations. Accuracy of Group EL at the EL task (.23) was 
lower than its accuracy at the JK task (.36), while both were very much 
inferior to the accuracy of Group NoEL at the JK task (.59). 
Two conclusions seem to follow from these results. First, the 
criteria utilized for the JK task are better indicators of future per-
formance than those used in the EL task. Whether such differences are 
in degree or in kind are beyond the present data. Secondly, the poorer 
JK performance of Group EL compared to Group NoEL would seem to indicate 
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again that previous experience with the same stimuli has a strong nega-
tive effect on the accuracy of later JK ratings for the same items. 
Table 9 also indicates listwise performance by all subjects. It 
was expected that EL accuracy would remain constant over lists while 
JK accuracy improved with practice. However, the biserial correlation 
may not be an adequate assessor of JK accuracy on lists after the first 
for the present data because of its nature as a comparison of group 
means in term of a dichotomous characteristic. That is, a few large-
valued erroneous predictions can influence the value of the correlation 
very much. Since all subjects, but especially Group NoEL, used extreme 
ratings more frequently with practice, this may explain the failure of 
Group NoEL's mean JK-recall performance correlations to increase with 
practice (.59, .55, .50, .56). Even under such a limitation, however, 
the mean JK-recall performance correlations for Group EL were found to 
increase with practice (.36, .46, .52, .43) while the EL-recall perfor-
mance correlations were more constant (.23, .23, .25, .30). 
To give a more adequate description of changes over lists in the 
differential accuracies of EL and JK ratings, therefore, both judgments 
were expressed as dichotomous predictors of recall performance and their 
accuracies determined. On each list, the average subject's dichotomous 
EL ratings were found to lead to 7.28 erroneous predictions of recall 
performance. This was reliably greater than the 5.17 JK errors found 
per list, F (1, 23) = 28.45, £ <.01. Because the mean number of EL 
errors in predicting recall performance was almost constant over lists 
(7.17, 7.79, 7.08, 7.08) while the mean number of JK errors decreased 
monotonically with practice (6.04, 5.37, 4.88, 4.38), the nonsignificant 
Q[ = 1.33) interaction of Error Type X Lists was unexpected. However, 
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individual t-tests performed for the four lists indicated that differ-
ences in the number of erroneous predictions by the two measures were 
reliable on the last three lists, ~'s (23, two-tailed) > 2.60, E <.02. 
The failure to find a significant interaction, then, would seem to have 
been highly influenced by a large degree of within-subject variability 
in EL accuracy over lists. For the same items, then, an individual sub-
ject's EL ratings proved much less accurate as predictors of recall per-
formance than his JK ratings. The differences may be said to have been 
generally greater after the first list. 
Predictions of overall recall performance by EL and JK values were 
also computed on group data. The mean EL value for each item was found 
to correlate .49, E <.001, with the number of times the PA item was 
recalled by Group EL. On a groupwise basis, therefore, EL ratings are 
rather accurate predictors of recall performance. The same prediction 
by the mean JK values of Group EL, however, was somewhat stronger at 
.64. In contrast to the results with the individual biserial correla-
tions, this JK~recall value by Group EL was similar to the .66 correla-
tion by Group NoEL. 
·Rather surprisingly, the mean EL rating for an item was also a 
good predictor for Group NoEL recall, r = .53. Similarly, the mean JK 
ratings by Group EL correlated .63 with Group NoEL recall while the mean 
JK ratings by Group NoEL correlated .57 with Group EL recall. 
Because group predictions were generally superior to those by in-
dividuals, it was decided to evaluate the present PA data in terms of 
the finding of Underwood (1966) that grouppredictions of individuals' 
free recall performance were superior to individuals' predictions of 
their own future free recall performance. Thus, group EL and JK values 
77 
were used to predict individual recall-nonrecall via biserial correla-
tions. When mean EL ratings predicted each subject's recall performance, 
the mean correlation was found to be .25 for Group EL. This value is 
rather similar to the mean value of .26 when subjects' own EL ratings 
predicted their performance. When the mean EL ratings were used to 
predict recall by Group NoEL, the mean correlation was similar, r = .27. 
When the mean JK values were used to predict recall performance 
for the individual subjects, the mean biserial correlation was .32 for 
Group EL's predictions for its individual members and .34 for Group EL's 
predictions of the other group's individual performances. These are only 
slightly less than the mean biserial correlation (.38) for each Group 
EL subject's JK ratings relative to actual recall or nonrecall. 
However, when the mean JK values for Group NoEL predicted individ-
uals' performances, the mean biserial correlation was .36 in regard to 
Group NoEL and .26 in regard to Group EL. The mean value of .36 for 
Group NoEL is in contrast to a .47 value obtained when the mean biserial 
correlations resulted from individuals' predictions of their own per-
formance. This difference within subjects is significant, ~ (23, two-
tailed) = 2.24, ~ <.05. To some extent, then, the JK ratings of indi-
vidual subjects in Group NoEL can predict the subjects' performance 
better than can those of the group. 
Secondary Analysis: EL and JK congruence and JK accuracy. The 
relationship between EL and JK ratings may also be studied by examining 
the effect of EL-JK similarity and dissimilarity on the validity of the 
JK. The concern in such an examination is whether two similar judgments 
about an item (predictive congruence) have different predictive validi-
ties than two opposite judgments about the same item (predictive incon-
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gruence). 
As in previous analyses, the comparisons will be on a dichotomous 
basis. Thus, if an item with a JK of 1 was previously given an EL 
rating of 1, 2, or 3, this is scored as predictive congruence. How-
ever, if a JK of 1 was originally given an EL rating of 4, 5, or 6, this 
is viewed as predictive incongruence. 
The average subject's probability of a correct JK prediction for 
predictively congruent items was found to be .69. This was ·no'!; si&n::t.::.: 
ficantly greater than the .66 probability found for predictively incon-
gruent items, t (23, two-tailed) = .59. Likewise, for subjects who had 
entries in both categories, congruent and incongruent predictions were 
both more accurate regarding recall than nonrecall. For predictively 
congruent items, the average subject was correct on 79% of the recall 
and on 50% of the nonrecall predictions, ~ (21, two-tailed) = 2.88, 
£ <.01. The 67% versus 46% difference for the incongruent predictions 
was in the same direction, but this failed to be statistically reliable, 
~ (22, two-tailed)= 1.89, .10>£> .05. Thus, when subjects gave two 
similar ratings to the same items, they were as likely to predict 
correctly as when they reversed their original assessment. 
The examination of the progression over lists of JK-EL congru-
ence or incongruence by similar intra-subject comparisons would have 
involved proportions based on very different numbers of instances, 
plus subject loss due to a failure to have both types of items on all 
lists. Instead, listwise data was examined collapsed across subjects. 
Table 10 presents this comparison of JK accuracy as a function of 
predictive congruence and incongruence over lists. 
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TABLE 10 
Predictive congruence-incongruence and 
probabilities of correct JK predictions 
Predictive Congruence (JK = EL) 
List 1 List 2 List 3 List 4 OVERALL JK=EL 
P(Correct Prediction re Recall): 
88 93 105 99 385 
106 = .83* 119 = .78* 128 = .82* 120 = .82* 473 = .81* 
611 
880 = .69 
P(Correct Prediction re Nonrecall): 
66 49 48 63 226 
139 = .48 92 = .53 81 = .59 95 = .66 407 = .56 
Preqictive Incongruence (JK f. EL) 
List 1 List 2 List 3 List 4 OVERALL JK:f.EL 
P(Correct Prediction re Recall): 
49 82 84 88 303 
63 = .78* 120 = . 68 131 = • 64 122 = .72* 436 = .70 
431 
656 = .66 
P(Correct Prediction re Nonrecall): 
36 33 30 29 128 
·n = .47 53 = .62 44 = .68 47 = .62 220 = • 58 
* E. <.05. 
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In general, similarities in JK accuracy for congruent and incon-
gruent JK predictions seem more prominent than dissimilarities. Indeed, 
the relation is almost one of proportional identity on the first list. 
Likewise, with one exception, both types of predictions lead to greater 
JK accuracy regarding recall than nonrecall, although the relationship 
is generally stronger for congruent predictions. Over lists, the prob-
ability of correct predictions of nonrecall increases for both types 
of predictions, with the improvement more monotonic for congruent pre-
dictions. The most striking difference between results for the two 
types of predictions is the greater accuracy regarding recall for con-
gruent than for incongruent predictions and the greater accuracy re-
garding nonrecall for incongruent items. 
In general, then, similarity or dissimilarity of the JK to the 
original EL judgment has little differential effect on JK validity. The 
two sets of data appear almost as random samples drawn from a larger 
population. On a dichotomous basis, then, similarity between the previ-
ous EL and the later JK may be more epiphenomenal than reflective of 
related underlying bases for the two judgments. 
Secondary Analysis: Stimulus characteristics ~predictive of 
the JK. The EL-JK relationship has been examined rather extensively so 
that some sense of direction may be obtained regarding the relationship 
between the JK and stimulus knowledge as expressed by EL ratings. A 
different approach to the role of stimulus knowledge in JK ratings is 
the consideration of the adequacy of actual stimulus characteristics as 
predictors of JK ratings. 
If stimulus characteristics are related to recall, they can be 
expected to provide accurate bases for a JK. However, because of the 
same relationship between the stimulus characteristic and recall, a 
correct prediction can also be expected under the hypothesis of memory 
knowledge. 
The present experiment attempts to minimize such interpretative 
difficulties by focusing not on only a single correlation but on two 
potential manifestations of the relationship. In effect, two samples 
will be drawn from the set of each subject's judgments of knowing--
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items whose JK ratings were correct predictions and items whose JK ratings 
were incorrect. For both correct and incorrect predictions, specific 
expectations are possible for different item types (Hits, Correct Rejec-
tions, Misses, False Alarms) at different levels of the stimulus char-
acteristic. 
The general procedure will be first to establish that the stimulus 
characteristic has a role in recall performance and that subjects were 
to some extent aware of this potential relationship in their EL ratings. 
Secondly, each subject's predictions will be described by the proportion 
Hit - Correct Rejection/Hit + Correct Rejection, while the incorrect 
predictions will be represented by the proportion Miss - False Alarm/ 
Miss + False Alarm. The terms of the proportions will be the number of 
items the individual subject has placed in the four categories at the 
relevant levels of the stimulus characteristic. The use of proportions 
is an attempt to equate the number of items in the correct and incorrect 
categories. The directionality of the terms in the proportions is meant 
to allow the expectation .of an interaction if JK ratings are given main-
ly as a function of the stimulus characteristic. 
For example, if JK ratings are theorized to be given as a function 
of response term imagery, it may be expected that low imagery items will 
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receive low JK values. If such predictions are correct, the low imagery 
items can be expected to be scored as Correct Rejections; if they are 
incorrect, as Misses. The same reasoning leads to the expectation that 
high imagery items will be given high JK ratings. If correct, such 
predictions would be classified as Hits; if incorrect, as False Alarms. 
When the terms for the correct predictions are combined in the Hit -
Correct Rejection/Hit + Correct Rejection proportion, it must therefore 
be expected that the proportion will be lower in value for low imagery 
items (when Correct Rejections predominate) than for high imagery items 
(when Hits are more prominent). 
In the Miss - False Alarm/Miss + False Alarm proportion, it may 
similarly be expected that the proportion will be higher in value for 
low imagery items (when Misses are greater in number) than for high 
imagery items (when False Alarms are in the majority). Since the pro-
portions for correct predictions are anticipated to increase with imagery 
while the proportions for incorrect predictions are expected to decrease, 
an interaction can be expected if JK ratings are given on the basis of 
response term imagery. 
Imagery as predictive of the JK. The first stimulus characteristic 
to be considered is that of response term imagery. To validate the re-
lationship between response term imagery and recall, each subject's 
number of correct recalls for each of the four levels of imagery per list 
was determined and became the dependent variable in a 2 X 4 X 4 ANOVA 
in which EL judgment (presence or absence), Lists, and Response Term 
Imagery Level were factors. The only significant effect was that of 
Response Term Imagery Level, F (3, 138) = 14.44, ~ <.01. As response 
term imagery increased, the mean number of recalls for that level also 
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increased (2.28, 2.50, 2.78, 2.89 out of a maximum of four recalls.). 
When the data were considered collapsed across subjects, the correlation 
between an item's response term imagery and the number of subjects who 
recalled the item was .38. 
To determine if Group EL subjects were aware of the potential 
relationship between response term imagery and recall, the mean ratings 
on the six-point EL scale were calculated for each of the four levels 
of imagery for each subject. TheEL values (3.08, 3.28, 3.48, 3.75) 
paralleled the increase in response term imagery, F (3, 69) = 14.77, 
E <.01. The same relationship between mean EL values and response term 
imagery was .43. 
In sum, response term imagery seems to have had a role in recall 
performance and subjects were somewhat aware of this potential relation-
ship in their EL judgments. 
The second part of this analysis involved the comparison of the 
proportions for correct and incorrect predictions of recall performance. 
The ideal analysis would have included eight ratios for each of four 
lists per subject. However, only two subjects had entries in all 32 
categories. Instead, to maximize the number of items in the proportions 
for each imagery level, the data were collapsed over lists and propor-
tions were formed on the basis of only two levels of imagery. Each 
subject thus contributed four proportions, a correct and an incorrect 
prediction proportion for each imagery level. The proportions for in-
correct predictions of low imagery paired-associates were thus based on 
. 10.3 items per subject and those of high imagery paired-associates on 
7.9 items. A 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA was performed on tbe factors EL judgments 
(presence or absence), Proportion type (proportion for correct predic-
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tions or for incorrect predictions), and Imagery level. Of the inter-
actions, only that between Proportion type and Imagery level was reliable, 
F (1, 46) = 9.94, E <.01. However, the interaction was not of the 
mirror-image type predicted. Instead, while the mean proportions for 
correct predictions rose with imagery level, from .23 to .50, the change 
for the mean proportions for incorrect predictions was minimal, from 
.15 to .18 over the two levels of imagery. Similar but not significant 
results were found by a 2 X 4 ANOVA which examined the two prediction 
ratios over four levels of imagery without regard to lists. 
However, it is plausible that incorrect predictions were incorrect 
precisely because of a difficulty in determining the level of the stim-
ulus characteristic. The generally small differences between Misses 
and False Alarms for all levels of response term imagery are not in-
compatible with such an interpretation. One should therefore expect 
the.greatest difficulty in labeling to occur for the two moderate levels 
of imagery so that performance on such items should be near chance for 
both correct and incorrect predictions. Yet, the trend for values of 
both types of proportions was to increase with level of imagery-- .14, 
.25, .38, .49 for correct predictions and .11, .19, .22, .19 for in-
correct predictions. Labeling difficulties do not seem an adequate 
explanation for the lack of similar JK values for items of similar 
imagery level. 
Following the previously explained reasoning, the data from the 
correct predictions may thus be taken as support for the hypothesis that 
the JK was based on the stimulus characteristic of response term imagery. 
However, the failure to find comparable results for incorrect predic-
tions casts doubt on the generality of this hypothesis. 
Learnability as predictive of the JK. 
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Because of such uncertain-
ty, a second variable was examined as a stimulus characteristic. This 
was labeled "learnability" and was defined as the number of times an 
item was recalled. It may be taken to refer to all those characteristics 
of a PA which predict its future recall or nonrecall. Its correlation 
with response term imagery was .38. Although the definition of this 
variable is subjective, the rather strong correlation of .73 between 
recall for the two groups in this experiment suggests generalizability. 
More importantly, the correlation of .71 between number of recalls and 
mean JK rating indicates a very strong relationship. The expectation 
of a similarly strong relationship between mean JK and both correct and 
incorrect predictions is thereby even more plausible than could be ex-
pected from the .46 correlation between mean JK and response term imagery. 
Four levels of the learnability dimension were determined for each 
list. This determination of learnability levels created an ordering of 
item difficulty within-lists which was slightly different from the 
ordering of the entire 64 item list. However, the four product-moment 
correlations between an item's within-list position in terms of number 
of recalls and the item's position in the overall list in terms of number 
of recalls were all very strong (from .98 to .998 for the four lists). 
Thus, little is lost when the data are considered without regard to list. 
More importantly, the lists may be said to have been counterbalanced with 
respect to learnability. 
The four levels of the learnability dimension were analyzed in 
the same manner as response-term imagery had been. As with imagery, the 
increase in EL ratings as a function of the learnability (3.06, 3.37, 
3.39, 3.76) was reliable, F (3, 69) = 16.48, £ <.01. For group data, 
the correlation between mean EL ratings and the learnability dimension 
was .55. 
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As was true with response-term imagery~ potentially small propor-
tions limited the nature of the analyses which could be performed. The 
data were therefore collapsed over lists to form correct and incorrect 
proportions for two levels of the learnability dimension. The ratios 
were analyzed via a 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA in which the factors were EL judg-
ment (presence or absence)~ Proportion type (proportion for a correct 
prediction or for an incorrect prediction)~ and Learnability levels. 
The dependent measure was the value of the proportion. The only signi-
ficant interaction was that of Proportion type X Learnability levels~ 
F (1, 46) = 5. 37 ~ .E. <.·os. However~ as in the previous analysis~ the 
interaction was not that predicted by a hypothesis of JK ratings based 
on learnability. Instead, the difference in bias ratios for the hard-
to-learn and easy-to-learn items was greater for the correct predictions 
(.10 versus .57) than for the incorrect predictions (.06 versus .33) .• 
The data were also analyzed by a 2 X 4 ANOVA in which Proportion 
type was examined over the four levels of the learnability dimension. 
The interaction was again significant, F (3~ 135) = 4.49~ .E. <.01. The 
monotonic increase over the learnability levels for correct predictions 
(-.09, .21~ .42~ .67) was greater than a similar increase for incorrect 
predictions (.00~ .14~ .30~ .37). 
Thus~ for easy-to-learn items~ subjects' correct predictions were 
more likely to be Hits than Correct Rejections while the differences 
were less clear among hard-to-learn items. This may be taken as support 
for a stimulus knowledge basis for the JK. However~ incorrect JK pre-
dictions reversed the trend regarding easy-to-learn items. JK errors 
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for easy-to-learn items were more apt to be Misses than False Alarms. 
Thus, the hypothesis of a stimulus knowledge basis for JK ratings must 
explain the somewhat paradoxical situation in which subjects sometimes 
gave easy-to-learn items a high JK and at other times gave items of 
the same class a low JK. 
Summary. The second question has investigated the relationship 
between EL judgments and JK ratings. A moderate correlation was found 
between subjects' EL and JK ratings for the same items. It may also 
be mentioned that, on a dichotomous basis, the EL judgment was found to 
be a poor predictor of later JK ratings for some subjects on all four 
lists and a decreasingly accurate predictor for subjects for whom the 
initial predictions were very accurate. Also, as a predictor of actual 
recall performance, the EL judgment was less adequate than the JK, even 
when the two predictors were compared on the first list where no possi-
bility of feedback was present. The negative effects of the EL task 
were also evident in such comparisons. 
Secondary analyses were also performed. The predictive accuracy 
of JK ratings proved extremely similar when they were both congruent and 
incongruent with earlier EL ratings. Another secondary analysis eval-
uated the stimulus characteristics of response term imagery and learna-
bility as predictors of JK ratings. Both dimensions were found monoton-
ically related to JK ratings when the predictions were later correct. 
However, the same monotomic relationships were not present with items 
whose JK ratings were later seen to be incorrect. 
--
guestion 3. Feeling of knowing judgments, scholastic achievement, and 
the Judgment of Knowing 
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The third question seeks first to determine if there is a relation-
ship between subjects' capabilities at feeling of knowing and judgment 
of knowing tasks. Secondly, the question examines va~ious educational 
achievement measures in their relationship to the JK. If success at 
the JK involves knowledge of the contents of one's memory, some relation-
ship may be expected between the JK and the FK judgment. Similarly, if 
scholastic achievement requires judgments of knowing, proficiency at 
the two tasks ought to correlate. 
The feeling of knowing judgment. Prior to a consideration of its 
relationship with the JK task, the FK task will be examined in its own 
right. Of the 52 general-information questions, the average subject 
recalled answers to only 7.85 or 15% of the items. This contrasts with 
the 40% recall by subjects in the more difficult of the two Hart (1965) 
general-information experiments. However, the present subjects ex-
pressed a positive FK judgment for 25.8 or 59% of the nonrecalled items. 
These proportions are similar to the 38% and 62% for the respective 
judgments in the Hart experiment. Comparisons between the present 
experiment and the Hart research seem appropriate. 
Table 11 presents the proportions of correct recognitions for 
the six FK scale positions pooled across subjects. The upper propor-
tions evaluated the accuracy of the first multiple-choice selections. 
When the data are considered for all subjects, the increase in the 
probability of correct recognition parallels the increase in the FK 
scale (.27, .31, .35, .43, .46, .61). When the individual probabilities 
of correct recognition for each scale position are evaluated against 
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TABLE 11 
Proportions of correct recognitions for the six FK scale positions 
FK* 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
119 121 142 211 110 89 
442 396 402 491 241 147 
.27 .31 .35 .43 .46 .61 
382 410 
1240 879 
.31 .47 
FK2** 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
229 237 248 342 163 115 
442 396 402 491 241 147 
.52 .60 .62 .70 .68 .78 
714 620 
1240 879 
.58 .71 
* 
Only the first multiple-choice answer is scored in the evaluation 
of FK accuracy. 
** Both multiple-choice answers are scored fD the evaluation of FK 
accuracy. 
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the chance probability of .25, the three lower values are all not sig-
nificantly different from the chance probability (~'s = .35, .79, 1.62 
for ascending FK values). Similarly, when the pooled data are considered 
dichotomously, the .31 probability of a Miss is not reliably greater 
than the chance probability of .25 (~ = .96). This is dissimilar to the 
findings of Hart (1965), Freedman and Landauer (1966), and DaPolito, 
Guttenplan, and Steinitz (1968), all of whom reported rather high _correct 
recognition probabilities for items given negative FK ratings (Misses). 
This result may be taken as a validation of Hart's (1967a) suggestion 
that correct predictions of nonrecognition (Correct Rejections) will 
occur at chance levels when item difficulty is high. 
In contrast to the results with lower FK ratings, the values for 
the three upper JK scale positions are all significantly greater than 
chance (z's = 2.72, 3.12, 4.75). Likewise, the .47 probability of a 
correct dichotomous FK prediction (Hit) is significantly greater than 
the .25 chance expectation (~ = 3.12). Although such results indicate 
above chance recognition probabilities of items subjects feel they know, 
the performance is far from perfect. 
The FK recognition probabilities were next considered dichotomous-
ly on a within-subject basis. Because the mean number of items given 
positive FK ratings was rather similar to that for the number given 
negative FK ratings, the Hart accuracy technique is more appropriate 
with the FK data than it was for the JK data. Thus, if the probability 
of a correct recognition given a positive FK judgment (Hit) is greater 
than the probability of a correct recognition given a negative FK judg-
ment (!Miss), the subject can be theorized to have some facility in 
knowing the contents of his or her memory. The terminology from signal-
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detection theory will be utilized in the same manner as it was for the 
JK. 
For the average subject, the probability of a Hit (.48) was reliab-
ly greater than the probability of a Miss (.31), ~ (47, two-tailed) = 
8.15, £ <.001. When the positive FK judgments were considered separately, 
the probability of a Hit (.48) was found to be not significantly differ-
ent from the probability of a False Alarm (.52),~ <1. This was an-
ticipated since Hart (1967a) has theorized a tendency for False Alarms 
to be rather high on a difficult FK task. For negative FK judgments, 
however, the probability of a Correct Rejection (.70) was reliably 
higher than the probability of a Miss (.30), ~ (47, two-tailed) = 6.32, 
£ <.001. For the present data, then, subjects were somewhat adept at 
predicting their future recognition choices. However, subjects were 
more accurate at indicating a lack of knowledge than its presence. 
· The subjects in the present experiment were also asked to select 
a second answer for each FK question. The second recognition choices 
by themselves are relatively unimportant. However, correct recognitions 
on second choices can be combined with correct recognitions of the first 
choices to provide an evaluation of overall FK accuracy which compen-
sates somewhat for item difficulty. 
The lower half of Table 11 contains correct recognition propor-
tions for the six FK scale positions when both first and second choices 
are included. The variable may be labeled FK2. The recognition pro-
babilities for FK ratings of 1, 2, 3 were all not significantly greater 
than the chance probability of .50 (~'s = .29, 1.58, 1.92) while those 
for FK ratings of 4, 5, 6 were all significantly greater than chance 
(z's = 3.04, 2.73, 3.97). As with first choices, the mean individual 
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Hit probability (.70) was found to be reliably greater than the mean 
Miss probability (.58),~ (47, two-tailed) = 5.00, £ <.001. Unlike the 
results with the first choices, though, the comparison of the Hit (.70) 
and False Alarm (.30) mean proportions was highly reliable,~ (47, two-
tailed) = 13.53, £ <.001. For negative predictions, however, the proba-
bility of a Miss (.58) was found to be reliably greater than that of 
a Correct Rejection (.42), ~ (47, two-tailed) = 5.50, £ <.001. This 
was not unexpected because the instructions had asked subjects to relate 
their FK judgment to the probability of a correct selection on the first 
choice. Thus, a subject who gave a FK of 3 or 2 might be expected to 
have given a higher rating if he believed that the FK judgment was to 
be tested by two choices. Thus, when the object of concern is the 
accuracy of both first and second choices, the present research will 
consider only measures which involve the positive FK2 predictions. 
. The feeling of knowing judgment and the Judgment of Knowing. Two 
kinds of measures are used to compare FK and JK performance: overall 
measures which combine positive and negative predictions and measures 
which consider positive and negative predictions separately. Because 
the appropriate descriptive statistic for comparing FK and JK performance 
is not obvious, three measures are used: FK Correct Predictions, FK 
Game-points, and the Hart accuracy measure (FK Accuracy). 
The FK Correct Prediction measures considered the FK predictions 
as dichotomous. The FK Correct Prediction value was determined by sub-
tracting the number of incorrect FK predictions from the number of 
correct FK predictions. To allow the separate consideration of negative 
FK predictions, the subject's number of Correct Rejections and Misses 
were subtracted to form a measure labeled FK Negative Accuracy. Simi-
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larly, Hits and False Alarms were subtracted to form a measure allowing 
the comparison of positive FK predictions, FK Positive Accuracy. Although 
the FK Correct Prediction score involved the difference between right 
and wrong predictions, it can be legitimately compared with the JK Errors 
value because the latter was based on a constant number of 64 items. 
Comparisons between the JK and FK Positive and Negative Accuracy measures 
are appropriate because all were formed similarly. Lastly, a measure 
labeled FK2 Positive Accuracy was formed by the subtraction of right and 
wrong positive FK predictions when the correctness of both the first 
and second choices was evaluated. 
The FK Game-points values were formed by the same scoring system 
as had previously been used for JK Game-points values. Every Correct 
Prediction measure was duplicated by a Game-points analysis. 
The FK Accuracy measure introduced by Hart was also compared with 
JK values. Because this measure equates the number of positive and 
negative predictions, it has advantages over the other two measures. 
FK Accuracy was found to correlate .77 with FK Correct Predictions and 
.60 with FK Game-points. FK Correct Predictions and FK Game-points were 
more strongly related to each other (.86). 
Prior to the actual comparisons of FK and JK scores, Groups EL 
and NoEL were compared on the various FK measures. No significant 
differences were found. Though the correlations later will be considered 
separately for the two groups, the present correlations are all based 
on 48 subjects. For this sample size, correlations of .29 and .37 are 
required for significance at the .05 and .01 levels, respectively. 
Table 12 contains Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients 
for overall FK and JK ratings. The correlations consistently indicate 
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TABLE 12 
Pearson product-moment correlations for overall JK and FK measures 
FK FK FK FK FKGP FK FKGP FK2 FK2GP 
CP* GP Ace. Neg. Neg. Pos. Pos. Pos. Pos. 
Ace. Ace. Ace. Ace. Ace. Ace. 
JK Errors -.38 -.30 -.31 
JK GP .31 .25 .26 
JK Neg. Ace. .32 
JK GP Neg. Ace. .20 
JK Pos. Ace. .33 .46 
JK GP Pos. Ace. .30 • 37 
* FK CP = FK Correct Predictions 
FK GP = FK Game-points 
FK Ace. = FK Accuracy 
FK Neg. Ace. = FK Negative Accuracy 
FK Pos. Ace. = FK Positive Accuracy 
etc. 
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a moderate relationship between FK and JK scores. The correlation between 
FK Correct Predictions and JK Errors was -.38; that between FK Accuracy 
and JK Errors was slightly less at -.31. The overall correlations based 
on game-points measures are slightly smaller but still offer complemen-
tary support for some similarity in capabilities at the two judgments. 
When the predictions of recall and nonrecall are compared sepa-
rately for the two tasks, the moderate relationship is still present, 
with the game-points measures correlating lower than the correct pre-
diction measures. 
The last two columns of Table 12 contain correlations which in-
eluded both the first and second recognition choices in the computation 
of the accuracy of positive FK predictions. The correlation of .46, E 
<.001, between the FK2 Positive Accuracy and JK Positive Accuracy 
strengthens the concept of a relationship between the FK and JK tasks. 
Correlations were also run separately for the EL and NoEL groups. 
Two observations may be made. First, the general size of the correla-
tions for the two groups did not differ greatly from those for the 
overall correlations. Second, overall correlations for Group EL were 
stronger than those for Group NoEL. For example, the FK Correct Pre-
dictions and JK Errors correlation for Group~ was -.52 while that for 
Group NoEL was -.30. Similar results in forthcoming analyses indicate 
that this difference was due to the presence of more extreme scores in 
Group EL than in Group NoEL. 
Secondary Analysis: Listwise comparisons between JK and FK 
accuracy. A secondary series of comparisons involved overall FK scores 
and JK performance on the four lists. Pe~nce on the FK task was 
not partitioned into halves or quarters because of the differing number 
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of recalls across subjects and because of the different locations of the 
recalled items. Although the relatively small number of JK errors in 
any one list casts doubt on potential generalizability, the comparisons 
seem worthwhile because any theoretical explanation for FK and JK sim-
ilarities would seem to have to expect a closer relationship with prac-
tice. For example, if the basis of both judgments is some capability 
at cue reading, a closer relationship ought to be present between the 
two judgments over lists as capability at cue utilization increases in 
the JK task. 
The previously mentioned FK overall measures (cf. Table 12) were 
correlated with their listwise JK complements. The listwise course of 
the correlations between FK Accuracy and JK Errors on the four lists are 
typical: .06, -.11, -.47, -.11. Thus, the measures consistently in-
dicated a low relationship between the FK and JK values on the first 
two ~ists. For almost all comparisons, this relationship increased 
very much on the third list. The consistent drop on the fourth list 
was unexpected because JK measures showed an increase on this list. Be-
cause the JK variance on the third and fourth lists was not reliably 
different (~ = .16), the lack of a relationship between the two tasks 
on the fourth list may indicate that subjects did not make judgments of 
knowing on the same basis as on the third list. 
When the negative FK predictions are considered separately, the 
change over lists for the correlations between negative FK and JK 
accuracy measures was rather small. This would again seem to reflect 
the greater ease of a negative FK judgment compared to a negative JK. 
The correlations for positive FK and JK measures, however, mirrored the 
overall relationship. The correlations increased en the first three 
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lists and decreased on the fourth list. 
It would seem that there is some increase in the FK and JK rela-
tionship over JK lists. However, if this is accepted, it would seem to 
follow that performance on the fourth JK list had a basis which is 
different from that on the previous lists. 
Secondary Analysis: FK accuracy in comparison with EL and JK 
accuracy. A final examination of the FK task is a tripartite compari-
son which relates FK values to both the EL and JK measures. Previous 
findings have indicated a moderate relationship between EL and JK tasks. 
Should there also be a strong relationship between FK and EL measures, 
then some task commonality would seem to obtain between the three judg-
ments. 
Each subject's FK Accuracy measure was first correlated with both 
of the previously mentioned biserial correlations between EL and JK 
ratLngs and recall performance. The two biserial correlations them-
selves were related via a correlation of .46. The correlation between 
FK Accuracy and EL accuracy was .12; that between FK Accuracy and JK 
accuracy was .39. 
Likewise, when the FK Accuracy measure was correlated with the 
number of erroneous dichotomous predictions of recall by EL ratings 
and by JK ratings, the correlation between FK Accuracy and EL errors 
was .02, while that between FK Accuracy and JK errors was .39. The 
two dichotomous measures correlated .28 with each other. The same 
differential relationships were also found when the FK Correct Predic~ 
tions and the FK Game-points measures were correlated with the respec-
tive JK and EL measures. 
The commonality between the JK and the other two predictive tasks 
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was anticipated by previous findings. However, the present data indi-
, 
cate that the FK and EL tasks are not related. It is as if the JK were 
similar to the EL judgment on·one basis and similar to the FK on another 
basis. Lastly, it may be noticed that the small relationship between 
individuals' EL and JK capability is possibly associated with subjects' 
relative inexperience at the EL task. Stronger within-subject correla-
tions may be present with more EL judgment practice. 
Overall scholastic achievement and the Judgment of Knowing. The 
second variable examined because of its theorized relationship with 
the JK was educational achievement. One subdivision was labeled over-
all educational achievement. This included Scholastic Aptitude Test 
(SAT Verbal and SAT Math) scores, American College Testing (ACT) program 
scores, and subjects' high-school ranks (HS Rank). A.second subdivision 
will be considered below. As the correlation iacreases between an edu-
cational achievement variable and measures of the JK, the tasks can be 
hypothesized to require similar capabilities. 
Of the 48 subjects, 30 had SAT scores; 37 had ACT scores, and 
34 had HS Ranks available. Only one subject had ao score available. 
Although the educational achievement scores were above average, the 
ranges were as broad as might be expected from first year college 
students. 
To validate that subjects with educational achievement scores 
available were representative of the entire sample in JK and FK perfor-
mance, _!-tests were performed in which the independent variables were 
presence or absence of the educational achievement score in question 
and the dependent variables were scores on the particular JK and FK 
tasks which were later to be correlated. The comparisons led to two 
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results. First, the JK and FK performance scores of subjects who did 
not contribute scholastic achievement scores were consistently inferior 
to those of subjects whose educational achievement scores were available. 
Secondly, the differences were significant only in three listwise com-
parisons which differentiated subjects on the basis of presence or ab-
sence of HS Rank, ~'s <2.25. For correlational comparisons, however, 
one would have hoped that more subjects with low FK and JK scores had 
SAT and HS Rank values available. 
Because it was not evident which JK and FK measures were optimal 
for comparisons with the overall educational achievement scores, the 
same measures which had previously examined JK and FK similarities were 
correlated with the four educational achievement measures. In general, 
the correlations were very low. Of the overall JK correlations, the 
strongest relationship was that between JK Errors and HS Rank, r = -.20. 
Of the overall FK correlations, the most strong relationship with the 
educational achievement measures was had by FK Accuracy. This measure 
correlated .23 with SAT Verbal, .25 with SAT Math, and .23 with HS Rank. 
Of all the correlations, the strongest was the .32 correlation found 
between the FK2 Positive Accuracy measure and HS Rank. 
Separate correlations were also performed for Groups EL and NoEL 
where sufficient data were present. The only finding of note was the 
consistently strong relationship between HS Rank and JK performance 
for Group EL. For example, the correlation between HS Rank and JK 
errors was -.43 for Group EL but -.05 for Group NoEL. The greater 
variability present among Group EL subjects would seem to be a suffi-
cient explanation for such differences. 
College course achievement and the Judgment of Knowing. The 
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second educational achievement measure examined was performance in an 
introductory psychology course. The subjects came from three course 
sections. Two of the three classes were team-taught so that both re-
ceived very similar instructions and identical or equivalent multiple-
choice tests. To make scores comparable, values of the relevant var-
iables were calculated as z-scores. 
Four variables were examined in relation to JK and FK performance. 
Individual test scores involved the subject's lowest multiple-choice 
test score (LoTest), the mean of the scores on the two higher tests 
(MidTest), and the subject's highest test score (HiTest). Two subjects 
had only three tests and hence their MidTest scores were based on only 
one score. The relative standings of subjects on the three tests are 
rather similar. Product-moment correlations between subjects' course 
grades and LoTest, MidTest, and HiTest scores were .80, .83, .80, 
respectively. 
All the final grades (A to F) in each class were scored on a 1 
to 5 basis and put into ~-score form to create the variable CourseGrade. 
Because mean performance was characterized by a z-score of .22 for the 
variable CourseGrade, the subjects seem rather representative of stu-
dents in the introductory psychology courses. 
Product-moment correlation coefficients were computed for the 
four college educational achievement variables paired with the same JK 
and FK performance variables which have been previously considered. 
The first observation of importance is that LaTest scores were 
consistently more strongly related to JK and FK performance than were 
either the MidTest or the HiTest scores. The correlation between LoTest 
and JK Errors is -.37; that with List 3 JK Errors is -.41; that with 
FK Accuracy is .35, and that with FK Positive Accuracy is .40. The 
strength of these LoTest relationships with JK and FK performance 
measures compares somewhat favorably to such predictors as SAT Verbal 
scores, ACT comprehensive scores, and HS Rank, which correlated .59, 
.30, .38, respectively, with LoTest scores. 
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The causality for the close relationship between JK and FK per-
formance and the LoTest variable is not obvious. However, it may be 
noticed that the moderate relationship between JK performance and scho-
lastic achievement as defined by LoTest scores is present under academic 
conditions in which it may be theorized that subjects have studied least 
adequately in relation to the study required for test success. This 
leads to the possibility that the JK and scholastic achievement rela-
tionship is related to level of learning. That is, even if a relation-
ship between scholastic performance and JK accuracy exists, it is plau-
sible that highly motivated college students of low JK ability are 
aware of their limitations in estimating their knowledge states and 
hence tend to overlearn material. If this is true, the relationship 
between poor capability at the JK and test performance will not be 
manifest when time for study is not controlled. 
The second point of interest regarding the variables based on 
introductory psychology course performance is that CourseGrade was more 
weakly correlated with JK and FK measures than the LoTest variable had 
been. Still, there is a low relationship present between CourseGrade 
and the total number of JK errors (-.23), List 3 JK Errors (-.26), and 
FK accuracy (.27). 
Because one of the three classes was treated differently from 
the other two by having a different teacher and different tests, the 
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previous analyses were repeated for only the two groups who had identi-
cal or equivalent tests. The resultant correlations were only slightly 
weaker than those for all subjects. The slight decrease would seem to 
have resulted from selective subject loss. 
The correlations were also performed for Group EL and NoEL sub-
jects separately. When the JK task and college educational achievement 
measures were compared, the correlations for the two groups were found 
rather similar in strength. However, the FK task and college education-
al achievement correlations were much greater for Group EL than for 
Group NoEL. For example, the FK Accuracy correlation with CourseGrade 
was .68 for Group EL but .01 for Group NoEL. 
Summary. In general, the relations of both JK and FK tasks to 
overall educational achievement measures such as SAT and ACT scores 
were found to be positive but rather low. Limitations on variability 
in the correlates of the overall educational achievement measures may 
have limited the size of the correlations. However, it is also plausible 
that SAT and ACT scores measure more general factors than are required 
for accurate JK or FK ratings. 
The relationships between the JK and FK variables with the intro-
ductory psychology course scores, in contrast, indicated a moderate re-
lationship between scores on each subject's lowest test and both the 
number of JK errors and FK Accuracy. That such a relationship was found 
with data from relatively uncontrolled measures of scholastic achieve-
ment leads to the possibility of a stronger relationship in a more 
temporally regulated situation. 
103 
Question ~· Learning ability and the Judgment of Knowing 
The effect of subjects' learning ability on the JK is studied so 
that conclusions may be reached regarding the role of process knowledge 
in the JK. That is, if improvement over lists is limited to very fast 
and slow learners, process knowledge would seem to be predominant in 
such improvement. Contrariwise, if improvement is possible without re-
gard to learning-ability, then stimulus knowledge and/or memory know-
ledge would seem potential bases for the JK. 
Learning ability was originally defined as the number of correct 
answers on five trials of the PA letter-number task. However, the 
correlation between this definition and the number of recalls on the 
four JK word lists was only .34, ~ <.02. Task identity is not strongly 
supported by such a correlation. Likewise, when subjects were divided 
into slow and fast learners on the basis of letter-number performance, 
differences in JK performance (of the kind to be discussed below) were 
rarely found between the two groups. Furthe~mention will not be made 
of the letter-number definition of learning ability. 
Because of such difficulties, learning ability was redefined as 
the number of correct recalls on the JK lists. Since Arbuckle and 
Cuddy (1969) found that the requirement to make predictions about future 
recall performance did not diminish recall, this measure seems an 
appropriate index of the desired construct. Still, the definition is 
less than optimal because learning ability is in effect defined as 
learning ability in a 16 item JK list. Subjects were then classified 
as fast, moderate, or slow learners on the basis of their rank in regard 
to the number of JK recal.ls. There were three sub-groups of eight sub-
jects each for both the EL and the NoEL groups. 
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Prior to other analyses, a 2 X 3 X 4 ANOVA was performed in which 
the dependent variable was number of recalls on the four JK lists and in 
which the factors were EL judgment (presence or absence), Learning-
ability (fast, moderate, slow), and Lists. Of the main effects, only 
that of learning-ability was reliable, F (2, 42) = 90.29, ~ <.001. The 
mean recalls per list for fast, moderate, and slow learners were 13.7, 
10.9, and 6.8 recalls, respectively. Newman-Keuls analyses indicated 
that the three means were reliably different from each other. Because 
no interaction was reliable, recall for each of the three learning abil-
ity levels may be said to have been constant over the four lists. 
Learning ability and practice at the judgment ~ knowing. The 
influence of learning ability on the improvement in JK accuracy with 
practice was analyzed first by a 2 X 3 X 4 ANOVA in which the factors 
were EL task (presence or absence), Learning-ability, and Lists. Since 
the ~ffects of EL judgment and Lists were analyzed previously, only 
the effect of Learning-ability need be considered. The main effect 
proved reliable, F (2, 42) = 5.88, ~ <.01. Fast, moderate, and slow 
learners made 3.84, 5.03, and 5.14 erroneous JK predictions per list. 
Newman-Keuls analyses indicated that the difference between fast and 
moderate subjects was significant but not the difference between moder-
ate and slow subjects. Fast subjects, then, tended to make less JK 
errors than either slow or moderate subjects. 
Of the interactions, only that between learning-ability and lists 
was reliable, F (6, 126) = 2.76, ~ <.025. Figure 2 indicates mean per-
formance over lists as a function of the three levels of learning-abil-
ity. The trend over lists for each of the three levels was analyzed 
separately. The linear component for the fast subjects was found to 
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be significant, F (1, lS) = 7.92, £<.OS. However, the linear component 
for moderate subjects failed to reach acceptable significance levels, 
F (1, lS) = 3.31, .10 > £ > .OS. Slow subjects were much less variable 
in JK accuracy over lists, F (1, lS) = .49. 
The possibility is thus presented that, for situations in which 
only one trial is given subjects on a relatively short list, improvement 
in JK accuracy may somehow be strongly related to fast subjects' recall 
performance (13.7 items per list) being very near to the criterion of 
total recall (16 items). 
In an attempt to clarify the role of learning-ability in the JK, 
the JK errors of the 32 subjects whose recall was middlemost among the 
48 experimental subjects were observed over the four lists. Since mean 
recall was 10.8 items per list, recall performance near criterion 
levels was not relevant to improvement in JK accuracy for these subjects. 
The €ffect of lists was found reliable, F (3, 93) = 2.82, £<.OS. Over 
lists, the mean number of JK errors decreased (S.66, 4.34, 4.72, 4·.28). 
However, the linear component of the trend over lists was not reliable, 
F (1, 31) = 2.4S, £ >.10. Newman-Keuls analyses indicated that the 
only differences between lists in JK errors was that between Lists 1 
and 2. Thus, although subjects of moderate learning ability can be 
said to have improved with practice relative to their initial perfor-
mance, the changes over lists differed from the linear trend for fast 
learners. Because of such differences in trend, further comparisons 
between improvement rates for the two groups seem inappropriate. The 
clarification of the role of near-criterion recall in improvement by 
fast learners must await further research. 
Summary. The analyses regarding the effect of learning ability 
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on the JK have indicated, first, that fast learners make a greater number 
of correct JK predictions than slow learners. However, the second 
finding is that only fast learners were able to improve their predictive 
accuracy with practice. Further research is needed to determine the 
role of near-criterion recall in this improvement. 
The relationship between EL and JK ratings and learning ability. 
Learning ability was also examined as a potential confound with respect 
to the relationship between EL and JK ratings. Because only 24 subjects 
were involved, a median split into fast and slow learners was considered 
preferable to three groups of eight subjects. Neither the Pearson 
correlations between EL and JK ratings nor the biserial correlations as 
indicators of the predictive accuracy of EL and JK ratings were greatly 
different for fast and slow learners, t's <.50. 
Secondary Analysis: Predictive congruence and learning ability. 
Pred~ctive congruence has previously been defined to occur when the JK 
and the EL ratings for the same items are similar, while predictive 
incongruence is said to occur when the two ratings are different. To 
examine predictive congruence as it is influenced by learning ability, 
a 2 X 4 X 2 ANOVA was performed in which the factors were Learning-
ability (Fast or Slow, 12 subjects at each level), Lists, and Congruence 
type (Congruent or incongruent predictions). The dependent variable 
was the probability of a correct prediction. The main effect of Con-
gruence type was not significant, F <1. However, the Learning ability 
X Lists X Congruence type interaction was significant, F (3, 66) = 2.86, 
£ <.05. For fast learners, the probability of a correct prediction 
increased with practice for both congruent and incongruent predictions. 
For slow learners, however, the probability of a correct prediction 
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increased with practice only for congruent predictions (.61, .68, .72, 
.78). For the incongruent predictions of slow learners, the proba-
bility of a correct prediction decreased with practice (.70, .67, .62, 
.57). Slow learners, then, were rather accurate at predicting per-
formance when the JK and EL ratings were in agreement but rather in-
accurate when the JK was different from the EL rating. 
Individual differences and learning ability. Various partial 
correlations were used to evaluate the relationship of learning 
ability to JK performance, FK performance, and scholastic achieve-
ment. 
The first point of interest is the decrease in the correlation 
between JK Errors and FK Accuracy from -.31 to -.19 when the number 
of JK recalls is partialled out. However, no change occurred when 
the same partialling operation was performed for the JK Errors and 
FK Correct Predictions correlation. (The correlation remained at .38.) 
The different results are due to the much stronger relationship JK 
recall maintains with FK Accuracy (.35) than was present between JK 
recall and the FK Correct Predictions measure (.08). 
Although no explanation is offered for such differences, a third 
partial correlation may be mentioned. Thus, the partial correlation 
between JK Errors on List 3 and FK Accuracy was seen to decrease only 
from -.47 to -.41 when the number of recalls on the four lists was 
partialled out. Similarly, the same correlation decreased only to 
.37 when the number of recalls on List 3 was kept constant. Definitive 
conclusions on the influence of learning ability on the JK relationship 
with FK capability are thus not present. 
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The final point regarding the relation between FK and JK perfor-
mance is the rather strong correlation between recall on the four JK 
lists and accuracy at the positive FK predictions. For example, the 
correlation between FK Positive Accuracy (right less wrong regarding 
FK positive predictions) and JK recall was .48 when FK Positive Accuracy 
was evaluated by both first and second FK choices. Since the correla-
tion with JK recall remains strong (.41) when the accuracy of positive 
FK predictions is defined by the proportion-based FK Hit measure, the 
relationship is not necessarily due to fast PA learners having a larger 
storehouse of general information available. The same conclusion is 
supported by the low correlation which the JK Miss proportion enters 
into with JK recall (.02). Similarly, this relationship is scarcely 
changed when the number of FK recalls is held constant while a new 
correlation is formed between JK recall and FK2 Positive Accuracy, from 
.48 to .44. Faster learners may simply be more aware of what they have 
in their memories. 
Partial correlations for the JK and FK measures with educational 
achievement measures were also computed. The originally small correla-
tions between overall educational achievement and JK and FK performance 
changed little when the number of JK recalls was partialled out. Of 
more importance was the maintenance of the moderate relations between 
LoTest scores and the JK and FK variables when the number of JK recalls 
was kept constant. The moderate relations which LaTest retained with 
JK Errors (-.31), List 3 JK Errors (-.37), and with FK Accuracy (.30) 
indicate further support for the presence of general factors other than 
learning ability in the JK. 
Time at the EL task and the Judgment of Knowing. Some concern was 
present because the increased study time allowed Group EL (a mean EL 
time of 4.8 minutes) did not lead to increased recall on the four JK 
lists relative to that for Group NoEL. However, the product-moment 
correlation between time at the EL task and number of correct recalls 
on the JK lists was of moderate strength, .39. The failure to find 
greater incidental learning may also indicate that EL judgments can be 
performed without the active responding operations which are important 
for learning. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
The judgment of knowing has been defined as the estimation of one's 
later memory for presently studied information. Three potential bases 
for the JK are stimulus knowledge, process knowledge, and memory know-
ledge. Although the three potential sources may not be mutually exclu-
sive in actual learning situations, the concepts seem adequately distinct. 
Stimulus knowledge was defined as knowledge which allows one to 
determine whether an item is easy or hard to learn. For example, an 
English speaker would probably rate a sentence in Turkish as harder to 
learn than the same sentence in Spanish--even before the two sentences 
have been heard. The basis for such stimulus knowledge is one's previ-
ous experience with stimuli which allows judgments of similarities and 
dissimilarities to be made. 
The second type of knowledge was labeled process knowledge. This 
type of knowledge was meant to indicate a rather general factor which 
refers to a familiarity with the adequacy of either one's own learning 
operations or of learning operations in general. Thus, one who has 
learned that a good mark on an Organic Chemistry test requires four 
hours of preparation can rightly expect subpar performance if he has 
studied for only one hour. 
The third type of knowledge was named memory knowledge. This 
refers to one's own knowledge of the present status of information in 
11e1110ry, to the knowledge that a memory has been formed. That memory 
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knowledge exists seems plausible in situations where associative attri-
butes are present as aids to future recall. However, the presence of 
memory knowledge in learning situations where little aid to memory is 
offered by past knowledge is less certain. 
Memory knowledge is theoretically distinguishabl~ from stimulus 
knowledge and process knowledge because these two potential sources do 
not require an attempt to learn information while memory knowledge is 
otherwise not possible. A second reason for distinguishing memory 
knowledge from the other two types of knowledge is that subjects seem 
to have a general ability to indicate that a memory was laid down in 
the past. Positing_memory knowledge thus postu~ate~ ~hat subjects can 
know quite soon after a learning attempt whether or not they have formed 
a memory which is retrievable. Nevertheless, the possibility also 
exists that memory knowledge is merely a conjunct of stimulus and pro-
cess knowledge such that a person may predict future recall performance 
because he can determine whether the amount of study given an item is 
proportionate to item difficulty. 
The desire to increase general knowledge regarding the JK has 
limited the present experiment to more empirical than theoretical 
concerns. However, the questions were chosen to allow some sense 
of direction regarding the three potential bases of the JK. 
Three general considerations regarding research ~ the JK. 
Prior to a consideration of the specific questions asked in this 
research, three more general concerns may be discussed, First, it was 
feared that research on the JK may have strong artifactual components. 
That is, it is plausible that subjects may Sbldy items differentially 
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and thereby give quite accurate judgments of knowing, especially nega-
tive judgments. A related possibility is that evaluation apprehension 
may cause subjects to withhold recall for learned items which have been 
given negative JK ratings. However, the present results seem to indicate 
that such factors had little import on the JK. 
Thus, although certitude about the presence, absence, or amount 
of differential study is impossible, the present finding of constant 
recall over lists would seem to indicate that such study would likely 
have been present from the first list. However, on the first list, study 
antedated information about the requirement of a JK. Therefore, any 
role for differential study would seem to be more as a constant factor 
than as a means for the facilitation of JK accuracy. Further, in the 
context of constant recall, the large increase over lists in the number 
of positive JK ratings, together with a decrease in the extremity of 
negative ratings, would seem to indicate that only a very limited num-
ber of items may be classified as having been unstudied. 
The likelihood of selective withholding during recall after a 
negative JK seems more easily determined. Thus, selective withholding 
is postulated as a defense mechanism. However, subjects recalled 47% of 
List 1 items given ratings of 1. No great need seems to be present for 
subjects to avoid such theorized embarrassment. 
One potential source for subjects' apparent motivation to study and 
recall all items is the presence of the game-points manipulation. Spe-
cifically, the pay-off matrix valued recall and nonrecall more highly 
than JK accuracy and rewarded or punished JK accuracy as a function of 
the extremity of the original rating. 
A second general consideration regarding the JK task was the 
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adequacy of the measure of JK accuracy. The present research concerns 
required lists moderate in length and in difficulty. With such lists, 
it may be expected that there will be subjects at both extremes of re-
call performance. With practice it may also be expected that such sub-
jects will be aware of their task proficiency and hence will utilize 
such knowledge in their predictions. A result may be many more items 
classified as recallable than nonrecallable or vice versa. If JK accur-
acy is measured by a proportion measure (v.g., the Hart Hit less Miss 
statistic), one of the two ratios for such subjects may be expected to 
be based on small numbers of instances. As has been seen, such propor-
tions may be very deceptive. Since the sum of JK errors as an accuracy 
measure is not influenced by category usage, it seems a better descrip-
tion of the present data. 
A third general concern was not considered until after the data 
had been collected. Specifically, later list iteas may either inhibit 
or facilitate recall performance. Thus, it is possible that the recall 
of a PA item which was rated as unrecallable may be facilitated by a 
later item serving as a mediator. Negative influences are similarly 
theorizable. That is, predictions based on the p.resent state of know-
ledge which are nominally correct must be scored as incorrect. 
However, JK predictions are meant to be made in light of a later 
test. Thus, "unlearning" would seem to be an indi.cation that the PA 
item was less well known than had been thought. Fmcilitation from other 
list items, in contrast, can not be similarly expbined. Although this 
may be tested by seeking an increase in the rates af Misses as the in-
terval between JK and test increases, the present aata were not designed 
to allow a sensitive test of such a possibility. Siould it be desired 
to minimize such influences, perhaps the Peterson and Peterson short-
term memory paradigm can be utilized. 
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Accuracy, practice, and the Judgment of Knowing. That the JK was 
an accurate predictor of future recall performance as both a dichotomous 
measure and as a six-point scale replicates previous results. As has 
already been mentioned, the contribution of the present research in this 
regard is the definition of JK accuracy which allows JK performance to 
be considered on an individual subject basis over lists. The first new 
datum that this experiment offers, then, is the finding of improvement 
in JK accuracy with practice. Though small on an absolute scale, this 
improvement was found to occur in the context of only one learning trial 
per list. 
Further, improvement in sensitivity was shown to be significant 
when negative JK predictions are considered as dichotomous measures. 
Although the trend for positive predictions was similar, this was not 
reliable. However, when usage of the scale po~itions is weighted so 
that extreme ratings are worth more than other ratings, the increase 
over lists in the number of points gained for pesitive ratings is sig-
nificant. The magnitude of the increase over lis~s of such expressed 
confidence for positive predictions which are eventually proven correct 
(Hit items) is particularly striking. 
A second result relative to the first question which is noteworthy 
is the bias change over lists from a predominance of Misses (incorrect 
predictions of nonrecall) to an equality of error types. It is as if 
subjects eventually made most of their predietions accurately and 
guessed randomly for the remaining predictions. 
A second interpretation of the fact of impr~ement with practice 
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refers to the characteristics of the stimulus knowledge which may serve 
as a basis for the JK. That is, it is plausible that knowledge about 
the relative ease of learning of stimuli may be a permanent part of 
one's memory for particular words. However, the fact of increased 
accuracy with practice would seem to require that such,knowledge include 
a learned component. What must be learned is not evident from the 
present data. For example, the requirement of deciding a single JK for 
a paired associate item may bear no direct relationship to separate 
judgments about each individual term and hence may have to be learned. 
The ~ of learning judgment and the Judgment of Knowing. In 
seeking to clarify the role of stimulus knowledge in the JK, the second 
question considered the relationship between ease of learning ratings 
and judgments of knowing for the same items. To minimize any role for 
process knowledge in the EL judgment, the task occurred prior to any 
experience with PA learning. 
The first finding in this regard is somewhat ambivalent. Thus, 
the product-moment correlation between the mean EL and JK ratings was 
very strong (.80). However, no individual subject manifested so direct 
a relationship. The mean individual correlation was much lower (.32). 
Further, the consideration of the EL as a dichotomous predictor of the 
JK indicated that for some subjects the hard-easy to learn distinction 
of the EL judgment was always a poor predictor of the JK while, for 
-.others, good predictability on the first list :dropped considerably 
with practice. It would seem that a r-ather .st:rong relationship is 
theoretically possible between the EL and JK r~ings for the same items. 
However, the relationship existing for individual subjects is generally 
only moderate. Further, because of the rather limited predictability 
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of the dichotomous EL regarding the dichotomous JK, any strong correla-
tion may be based more on the relative extremity of some individual items 
than on the hard-easy dichotomy itself. 
A second datum from this question is that the predictive validity 
of the JK was found consistently superior to the EL judgment. Thus, 
the mean EL ratings for items were somewhat accurate predictors of 
Group EL's number of recalls for the same items, r = .49. (It may be 
noticed that this is not as large a correlation as those around .90 
which have been found in the free recall task by Underwood, 1966.) How-
ever, the same subjects' later mean JK values were better predictors of 
future recall performance than the EL ratings, r = .64. Similar differ-
ences were present with individuals' EL and JK ratings. 
An attempt was next made to discover if subjects could predict 
their own performance better than could the group. Individual EL values 
were· found no more accurate in predicting recall than the group EL 
values. However, the individual JK values of Group EL subjects were 
slightly better predictors of recall performance than the group JK 
values. More importantly, the individual JK values of NoEL subjects 
were significantly more accurate than the JK values of Group NoEL. 
Contrary to results with EL judgments (Underwood, 1966), the JK ratings 
of individual subjects in a PA task were better predictors of their own 
ratings than were the group's ratings. 
The general superiority of JK ratings over EL ratings also has 
theoretical import. Thus, if the JK ratings of Group NoEL were made 
on a basis similar to the hard-easy dichotomy present in the EL judg-
ments, their accuracy could then be expected to be similar to that of 
the EL ratings, especially on List 1 when feedback was not present for 
Group NoEL. The differences, however, were quite substantial: the 
mean biserial correlation for the JK ratings of Group NoEL was .59 
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while that for EL ratings was .23. The strong EL inferiority makes it 
very doubtful that subjects in Group NoEL based their JK ratings on the 
knowledge manifest in the ease of learning judgments. The experimenter-
paced study and JK trials given subjects may have increased their capa-
bility at determining if a PA item appears hard or easy to learn. Sim-
ilarly, memory knowledge may have been involved in the JK. 
However, it may also be mentioned that, while improvement in 
stimulus knowledge is a possibility, the means whereby such improvement 
can occur are not immediately obvious. That is, for the free recall 
of individual items, highly accurate predictions based on EL judgments, 
pronunciability, and association value have been found to correlate 
highly (Underwood, 1966). Similarly, EL judgments correlated highly 
witQ judgments regarding the degree of similarity of meaning of PA 
items (Richardson & Erlebacher, 1958). Thus, improvement is unlikely 
to occur merely by the use of different objective criteria. 
A third interesting result from the examination of the EL and 
JK relationship is the finding that the EL task leads to poorer JK 
performance. This is present on all lists and is not clearly related 
to the type of prediction. Thus, when JK accuracy on List 1 was com-
pared for Group EL and Group NoEL, the mean biserial correlations were 
.36 and .59 for the respective groups. It was also found that the JK 
predictions of Group NoEL involved greater confidence than those given 
by subjects familiar with the items. Though the performance of the 
EL task may have caused such differences, the causality would seem more 
likely to be the result of item familiarity. However, since the present 
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experiment was designed to observe potential effects of the EL task rather 
than to control its role in the JK, further research is required before 
even the basic datum is shown reliable. 
Such experimentation may be rather similar to that necessary to 
offer comments on the roles of stimulus and memory knowledge in the JK. 
In essence, what is required is a procedure which will effect memory 
knowledge but allow stimulus knowledge to be constant. Better controlled 
familiarization is one potential means to assess this concern. However, 
a procedure of more value than familiarization in the disentangling of 
stimulus and memory knowledge would take advantage of the known effects 
of the AB, AC paradigm in PA learning. Thus, subjects would first 
learn a number of PA lists with either homogeneous or randomly chosen 
items. The expectation is for an. improvement in JK accuracy and an 
increase in confidence over lists. Then, for one group, the last list 
may take the form of an AC relationship to the previous AB list. Fur-
ther, the number of trials on all lists should be such that the AC 
association on the last list may be approximately equal to that for the 
AB association. The other group, of course, would learn a new last list. 
The interpretation of causality on the trials before the last list 
is unimportant because stimulus and memory knowledge would be confounded. 
On the last trial, however, the hypothesis of a memory knowledge basis 
for JK ratings would seem to expect less certain JK ratings for the AC 
than for the CD group because the actual knowledge state can be expected 
to be one of less strong PA associations. The stimulus knowledge in-
terpretation, however, should not expect any change, unless possibly 
more extreme ratings because of greater familiarity with the stimulus 
terms. The accuracy of such predictions would seem to be less important 
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than the confidence expressed in the JK ratings because predictions 
based both on stimulus knowledge and on memory knowledge may be expected 
to lead to less accurate ratings. 
Even in such a design, however, it must be mentioned that process 
knowledge may serve as a confound. That is, a person to some degree 
fearful that the changed stimulus-response term relationship may be det-
rimental to future recall might thereby decrease his JK ratings. How-
ever, further research is necessary before such a potential confound 
need be considered. 
Two results of secondary analyses regarding the JK may also be 
mentioned. First, it was found that items to which subjects gave 
dichotomously similar JK and EL ratings had probabilities of correct 
predictions which were very similar to those for items with JK ratings 
dichotomously opposite to EL ratings. Dichotomous similarity between 
JK and EL ratings may thus be epiphenomenal rather than reflective of 
similar underlying bases. 
A second result was that JK ratings were found to be not simply 
related to levels of the stimulus characteristics of response term 
imagery and learnability (the number of times an item was recalled). 
Thus, items whose predictions proved to be accurate were positively 
related to the stimulus characteristics. However, items whose predic-
tions proved erroneous did not appear to receive JK ratings in relation 
to their position on the relevant stimulus characteristic continuum. 
It is difficult to conceive why items on similar levels of a stimulus 
characteristic would not be given similar JK ratings if subjects made 
JK ratings on the basis of the stimulus characteristic alone. 
Feeling of knowing judgments, scholastic achievement, and the 
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Judgment of Knowing. In examining the relationship between the FK 
judgment and the JK, the reasoning was that proficiency at the JK task 
ought to be similar to that at the FK task if the JK indicates a know-
ledge of the contents of one's memory. Moderate correlations were 
generally found. Since the difficulty of the questions led to negative 
FK judgments being much easier to make than positive predictions, many 
· questions offered little discriminability between subjects as to FK 
capabilities. It is thus possible that relationships at the two tasks 
would be stronger if FK items required a greater degree of memorial 
assessment. However, while some support is present for the hypothesis 
that both JK and FK tasks involve a knowledge of memorial contents, the 
correlation does not specify whether such knowledge is inferential or 
more direct. More importantly, it must be noted that "knowledge of 
memorial contents" need not have the same meaning when it is the basis 
for a prediction of recognition (i.e., a feeling of knowing) as when 
it supports a prediction of recall (i.e., a Juqgment of Knowing). Be-
cause of this, a specific interpretation of the moderate correlation 
would be very tenuous. 
It may also be mentioned that FK proficiency was much more 
strongly related to JK accuracy than to EL accuP&cy while JK accuracy 
was similarly related to EL and FK accuracy. The abilities required 
for JK accuracy may thus facilitate both unpracticed stimulus evalua-
tion and the knowledge of the contents of one's memory. However, the 
abilities required for the EL judgment may be dissimilar to those needed 
'for the feeling of knowing. 
The second individual difference variable examined was scholastic 
achievement. It was theorized that, if a decision similar to the JK is 
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required for successful school performance, high correlations should be 
found between scholastic success and JK ability. The relationship be-
tween JK (and FK) performance with the overall educational achievement 
measures (SAT, ACT, HS Rank) was low·at best. Because the present 
achievement scores were skewed toward the higher direction, low corre-
lations might not have been unexpected. However, it is at least as 
plausible that the low relationships were due to task dissimilarity. 
The JK was also examined in its relationship to performance in 
an introductory psychology course. The correlations were at their 
highest (.37 with JK Errors; .35 with FK Accuracy) when the correlate 
considered was the subject's lowest test score for the course. Why 
this correlation should be stronger than others is not known. However, 
it is possible that a JK-scholastic performance relationship can only 
be manifest when study is not prolonged, as might be the case when 
test performance is at its worst. That is, it is possible that there is 
a relationship between JK ability and school grades but that highly 
motivated subjects of low JK ability can maintain a high level of per-
formance by overlearning material. To test such a hypothesis, a better 
scholastic situation would involve a limited study time to prevent 
overlearning. 
Learning ability and the Judgment of Knowing. In attempting to 
delineate the influence of learning ability ~n the previous three 
questions, learning ability was defined as the number of correct re-
calls on the four JK lists. The first result of note was that fast 
learners were found to have made more correct JK predictions than slow 
learners. 
The second important result was the finding that improvement in 
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JK accuracy was related to learning ability. Only subjects of high 
levels of learning ability showed linear improvement in JK accuracy with 
practice. Subjects of slow and moderate learning speed did not show 
similar improvement. These results question the generality of the find-
ing of improvement in JK accuracy with practice. 
The nearness of the fast learners to total list recall also in-
troduces the possibility that improvement is somehow an artifact of the 
fast learning of a relatively short PA list. That is, fast learners' 
increase in the number of positive JK predictions over lists (8.8, 10.9, 
13.2, 14.1) may be related to their constant recall of 13.7 items per 
list. Specifically, for a 16 item list, fast learners' increase in 
positive JK predictions in effect limited the number of possible JK 
errors. For example, the average fast learner who recalled a constant 
14 items per list could have made up to 10 JK errors on List 2 when 
he predicted recall for only 11 items but could only have made four JK 
errors on List 4 when he predicted recall for 14 items. Although the 
actual role of near-criterion recall in JK improvement in unclear, the 
possibility of such an influence would be less viable if the JK task 
occurred for a longer list in which total recall would be less likely. 
A longer list may also clarify the role of a second potential 
factor in the JK improvement of fast learners. Thus, it is possible 
that fast learners are more aware of differences between the memorial 
status of to be learned materials than are other subjects. Having a 
better referent for a "known" item than other subjects, theymay learn 
more accurately which items are not emcompassed by the definition. 
Partial correlations which kept the effect of learning ability 
constant were also used to examine the moderate correlations entered 
into by JK accuracy with FK capabilities and with scores on subjects' 
lowest course tests. 
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The status of the JK relationship with FK capability is unclear 
because the relationship with FK Accuracy increased from -.31 to -.19 
while that with the right-less-wrong measure of FK accuracy remained 
constant at .38. The far stronger relationship between recall perfor-
mance and FK Accuracy than with FK Correct Predictions is the major 
cause of the decreased relationship. The relationship between LoTest 
scores and JK accuracy was unchanged when the partial correlation kept 
learning ability constant. 
Lastly, a surprising finding was the rather high correlation be-
tween learning ability and accuracy at the positive FK predictions. 
(The relationship is slightly lower when negative predictions are in-
cluded together with positive predictions. This decrease would seem to 
be related to the difficult questions not differentiating between 
subjects.) The relationship does not seem due to the fact that fast 
learners are likely to have more information available. The correlation 
changes li.ttle when positive FK performance is considered as either an 
absolute number or as a proportion or when FK recall is partialled out. 
It is thus possible that the ability to know one's memorial con-
tents is central to rapid learning. That is, it is possible that 
learning occurs more quickly when subjects are more aware of the running 
content of their memories. It is thus possible that reflection on the 
to be learned material is intimately related to the facilitation which 
generally occurs when subjects are asked to use mnemonics or natural 
language mediators to learn paired-associates and to the facilitation 
of free recall learning from conscious attempts at categorization. If 
slow learners can be encouraged to reflect more on their knowledge by 
such means as frequent self-testing, improvement in memory tasks may 
• be predicted. 
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Summary of the present research. The present study has dealt with 
the prediction of later retention for presently studied-information. 
Such an estimation about whether study has been sufficient to allow 
later recall has been called the Judgment of Knowing (JK). 
Three types of knowledge have been offered as potential bases for 
the JK. However, lack of information about the JK has led the present 
concern to be more data-oriented than theoretical. 
The initial question concluded that the JK is a valid predictor 
of response term recall in a paired-associate task. Although the posi-
tive JK was more likely to predict performance accurately than the nega-
tive JK, both types were reliably more often correct than incorrect. 
More importantly, the first question found that JK accuracy in-
creased linearly with practice. Further, while listwise improvement was 
reliable for negative but not for positive predictions, confidence in 
positive predictions which were later proven coTrect increased much more 
over lists than confidence in positive predictions later proven incorrect. 
The second question examined the relationship between the JK and 
a judgment about items' ease or difficulty of learning (Ease of Learning 
or EL judgment). A very high correlation was present between mean EL 
and JK ratings for the same items. However, the same relationship for 
the average subject was only moderate. Further, on a dichotomous basis, 
the EL judgment had little validity as a predictor of an item's later 
JK for half the subjects on all four lists and was a decreasingly 
accurate predictor over lists for subjects whose original EL and JK 
correspondence was high. 
The EL judgment was also found inferior to the JK as a predictor 
of recall performance. 
Lastly, the EL data may indicate that experience with to be 
learned material shortly before the JK task reduces both the accuracy 
and the expressed confidence of the JK. 
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The third question compared the JK and the feeling of knowing 
judgment in which subjects predict their likelihood of correctly recog-
nizing unrecallable answers to general information questions. A moder-
ate correlation was found. 
Comparisons were also made between the JK and scholastic perfor-
mance. Correlations between JK accuracy and measures of overall educa-
tional achievement (v.g., SAT) were positive but low. However, a moder-
ate correlation was found between JK accuracy and scores on the subjects' 
lowest test in an introductory psychology course. 
The fourth question examined the role of learning ability in the 
JK. Fast learners were found to make more correct predictions than slow 
or moderate-speed learners. When JK accuracy for the three levels of 
learning ability was examined over lists, the only linear trend which 
was significant was that for fast learners. Further research is needed 
to determine if the fast learning of a relatively short list is a con-
found in JK improvement with practice. 
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APPENDIX A 
Stimulus and response terms for the PA lists 
List A Response Mean EL* Mean JK* Recalls* 
Imagery* 
GUN - CONCEPT 1.93 58.7 4.2 30 
COW - ADAGE 2.77 75.4 3.0 30 
NET - GENDER 2.90 69.1 3.8 23 
GEM - DECEIT 3.30 64.1 3.9 31 
TAR - NAMESAKE 3.37 61.9 3.6 36 
BAY - WORKHOUSE 4.00 59.7 4.1 36 
MAN - PREVIEW 4.03 60.8 3.9 37 
CAT - IMPACT 4.43 51.6 4.2 33 
JUG - CHAOS 4.57 62.5 4.2 28 
HAM- PORTAL 5.10 76.2 3.2 35 
RAG·- INVOICE 5.17 72.1 3.3 26 
PAN - DUMMY 5.83 52.3 3.8 29 
PUB - BANDIT 5.83 54.3 4.6 35 
DEN - HURDLE 6.33 57.5 3.7 32 
BOX - POSTER 6.33 38.4 4.5 39 
KEY - BOUQUET 6.77 58.0 4.0 34 
* The Response Imagery values are on a 1-7 scale, with higher values 
indicating a greater degree of imageability. 
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The Mean EL values are on a 1-120 scale, with higher values rated as 
harder to learn. 
The Mean JK values are on the 1-6 scale previously described. 
The maximum number of Recalls is 48. 
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List B Response Mean EL Mean JK Recalls 
Imagery 
RAT - CONTEXT 2.13 63.0 3.4 26 
BAG - PROXY 2.70 79.5 3.1 2/J 
GUM - ABBESS 2.97 77.9 3.4 31 
COT - MALICE 3.30 80.4 3.2 20 
LOG- SATIRE 3.37 68.5 3.3 34 
NUT - BOREDOM 3.83 46.0 4.5 30 
PIN - GARRET 4.13 76.2 3.3 19 
MOP - TIDBIT 4.37 66.7 3.7 31 
LEG - CASEMENT 4.63 47.5 4.7 40 
LIP - PHANTOM 5.03 66.5 4.4 34 
FIG - KERCHIE:F 5.23 60.1 4.2 28 
GAS - HORSEHAIR 5.67 59.8 4.3 30 . 
PAW - STOREROOM 5.87 65.1 3.8 22 
CUP - LOCKER 6.27 48.6 4 .. 6 38 
JAW - DAYBREAK 6.43 47.2 4.7 40 
VAN - SUNBURN 6. 72 52.5 5 .. 1 47 
~ "-·" .-
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List C Response Mean EL Mean JK Recalls 
Imagery 
HAY - FOIBLE 2.20 87.6 2.6 14 
MUD - RATING 2.60 54.7 3.8 24 
FAN - STEERAGE 3.00 75.3 3.1 19 
BAT - HINDRANCE 3.07 73.8 3.9 32 
DOT - ONSLAUGHT 3.67 68.5 3.2 33 
JAM- GADFLY 3. 77 59.2 3.1 30 
BUG - ROSIN 4.20 68.4 3.4 16 
CAR - BUFFOON 4.33 66.8 4.4 42 
WEB - DEMON 4.70 38.6 5.0 44 
WAX - LIMELIGHT 4.83 60.2 4.1 39 
KIT - GINGHAM 5.33 77.5 2.7 20 
ROD - MAMMAL 5.57 63.8 3.9 35 
BOW - REPTILE 6.00 57.5 4.1 33 
FUR - TRIPOD 6.23 76.8 3.8 30 
HEN - SPINACH 6.47 60.4 4.5 34 
MAP - SHOTGUN 6.60 54.8 4.2 40 
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List D Response Mean EL Mean JK Recalls 
Imagery 
TIN - ESSENCE 2.33 63.3 4.1 34 
DOG - OUTCOME 2.40 51.6 4.4 32 
JET - SAVANT 3.07 80.9 3.1 30 
CAN - UPKEEP 3.07 55.5 4.2 37 
FOX - OFFSHOOT 3.67 54.4 3.7 23 
SAW - PRESTIGE 3.67 68.8 3.6 32 
PAD - CHLORIDE 4.20 74.0 3.8 22 
TUB - VENOM 4.23 74.9 4.3 40 
TOY - REFLEX 4.73 48.5 4.5 39 
WIG - TRACTION 4.77 73.3 3.9 36 
SUN - COWHIDE 5.40 51.6 4.8 39 
RIB - LEAFLET 5.47 64.8 3.1 25 
RUG - GOBLET 6.03 62.4 4.1 36 
BAR - HAIRPIN 6.13 55.0 4.2 37 
PEN - BLISTER 6.53 37.7 4.8 36 
HAT - LOBSTER 6.57 51.3 4.3 27 
APPENDIX B 
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Feeling of knowing questions 
The first number beneath each question indicates the number of 
times the answer was recalled by the 48 subjects; the second number 
indicates the mean FK judgment for the item when the answer was not 
recalled; the third value is the probability of a correct recognition 
given a positive FK (Hit), the last value the probability of a correct 
recognition given a negative FK (Miss). The answers appear on a separate 
sheet which follows the questions. 
1. Who was the Democratic head of the House Judiciary Committee during 
last year's impeachment hearings? 
2 3.7 10/27 = .37 
a. Edward Hutchinson 
b. Peter Rodino 
2. Who wrote the James Bond 
18 3.0 13/15 = .87 
a. John le Carre 
b. Ian Fleming 
3. Who painted "Afternoon at 
1 1.9 0/3 = .00 
a. Edouard Manet 
b. Henri Matisse 
8/19 = .42 
·C. James Rhodes 
d. Carl Albert 
novels? 
7/15 = .47 
c. John Cheevers 
d. Peter MacDonald 
La Grand Jatte"? 
5/44 = .11 
c. Pierre Bonnard 
d. Georges Seurat 
4. What is the capital of Saudi Arabia? 
0 3.0 5/20 = .25 6/28 = .21 
a. Medina c. Bahrain 
b. Riyadh d. Qatar 
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5. Who won an Academy Award for the female lead in the movie "The Prime 
of Miss Jean Brodie"? 
3 3.4 9/22 = .41 5/23 = .22 
a. Maggie Smith c. Vanessa Redgrave 
b. Glenda Jackson d. Susanna York 
6. Who was the first man to step on the moon? 
23 4.0 14/17 = .82 6/8 = .75 
a. Edwin Aldrin c. Neil Armstrong 
b. Frank Borman d. Alan Shephard 
1. Who wrote Go Tell It on the Mountain? 
-------
2 2.4 4/10 = .40 11/36 = .31 
a. Richard Wright c. Leroi Jones 
b. James Baldwin d. Ralph Ellison 
8. For whom was "Sunnner in the City" a hit record? 
12 3.2 12/17 = .71 6/19 = .32 
a. Beach Boys c. Lovin' Spoanful 
b. Fifth Dimension d. Carpenters 
9. Who was the first European to explore the length of the Mississippi 
River? 
2 3.5 8/26 = .31 4/20 = .20 
a. Louis Jolliet c. Jacques Marquette 
b. Jean Nicolet d. Sieur de la Salle 
10. Who sang "The Look of Love" in the movie Casino Royale? 
4 2.9 12/17 = .71 14/27 = .52 
a. Roberta Flack c. Dionne Warwick 
b. Aretha Franklin d. Diana Ross 
11. Whose creation is Holden Caulfield? 
6 2.0 6/6 = 1.00 14/36 = .39 
a. J.R. Tolkien c. John Updike 
b. Joseph Heller d. J.D. Salinger 
12. Who immediately succeeded Stalin as the head of state in Russia? 
0 1.8 8/31 = .26 4/17 = .24 
a. Georgi Malenkov c. Nicolai Bulganin 
b. Lavrenti Be ria d. Vyacheslav Molotov 
13. Who founded Hull House in Chicago? 
9 2.9 15/19 = .79 7/20 = .35 
a. Dorothea Dix c. Mother Frances Xavier Cabrini 
b. Jane Adams d. Mother Katherine Drexel 
14. What boxer defeated Joe Louis for the heavyweight boxing title 
when Louis attempted to return from retirement? 
0 2.9 1/18 = .06 0/30 = .00 
a. Rocky Marciano c. Sugar Ray Robinson 
b. Jersey Joe Walcott d. Ezz~rd Charles 
15. Who wrote the poem "Leaves of Grass"? 
7 2.0 3/5 = .60 8/36 = .22 
a. Henry Wadsworth Longfellow c. Robert Frost 
b. James Russell Lowell d. Walt Whitman 
16. Who painted "Aristotle contemplating the bust of Homer"? 
3 2.1 3/5 = .60 7/40 = .18 
a. Rembrandt van Rijn c. El Greco 
b. Vincent van Gogh d. Peter Paul Reubens 
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17. Who played the role of the airport manager in the movie "Airport"? 
12 3.6 12/20 = .60 5/16 = .31 
a. Rod Taylor c. Charlton Heston 
b. Richard Burton d. Burt Lancaster 
18. Who was the man Capone sought to kill on St. Valentine's Day? 
10 3.2 15/20 = .75 11/18 = .61 
a. J. McGurn c. G. Moran 
b. D. O'Banion d. J. Colosimo 
19. Who was the boatman on the river Styx who ferried the souls of the 
dead to Hades? 
0 2.9 9/18 = .so 8/30 = .27 
a. Jason c. Charon 
b. Nestor d. Pluto 
20. Who was the last horse to win horse racing's triple crown before 
Secretariat? 
1 2.6 9/14 = .64 14/33 = .42 
a. Whirlaway c. Count Fleet 
b. Man O' War d. Citation 
21. Who was the official (administrative) head Df the White House 
plumbers? 
0 3.0 1/22 = .05 5/26 = .19 
a. E. Howard Hunt c. Egil Krogh 
b. Charles Colson d. G. Gordon Liddy 
22. Who wrote the play "She Stoops to Conquer"? 
--.. 
1 2.1 4/7 = .57 8/40 = .20 
a. Oliver Goldsmith c. Alexander :Pope 
b. Richard Sheridan d. Christopher Marlowe 
23. What city is the capital of Canada? 
4 4.5 8/36 = .22 3/8 = .38 
a. Ottawa c. Montreal 
b. Quebec d. Toronto 
24. Who is the present Illinois Secretary of State? 
13 3.8 17/19 = .89 8/16 = .50 
a. Neil Hartigan c • Alan Dixon 
b. Michael Howlett d. Lewis Carpentier 
25. What Spaniard extensively explored the U.S. Southwest? 
1 4.1 3/30 = .10 
a. Vasco de Balboa 
~ b. Hernando Cortes 
2/17 = .12 
c. Hernando de Soto 
d. Francisco Coronado 
26. Who is considered the inventor of the radio? 
7 3.0 7/16 = .44 9/25 = .36 
a. George Westinghouse c. Enrico Fermi 
b. Thomas Edison d. Guglielmo Marconi 
27. What is the name of the monster in the English epic Beowulf? 
2 3.1 18/22 = .82 9/24 = .38 
a. Grendel c. Naegling 
b. Hrothgar d. Breca 
28.What is the name of the longest river in the world? 
22 4.2 12/18 = .67 4/8 = .50 
a. Amazon River c. Yangtze River 
b. Nile River d. Mississippi River 
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29. Who is the present governor of New York? 
0 3.1 10/18 = .56 7/30 = .23 
a. Abraham Beame c. Louis Lefkowitz 
b. Malcolm Wilson d. Hugh Carey 
30. What was the name of the movie in which Sidney Poitier played a 
vacationing northern law officer in Mississippi? 
12 3.4 13/17 = .76 6/19 = .32 
a. They Call Me Mister Tibbs c •••• Tick ••• Tick ••• Tick 
b. In the Heat of the Night d. The Defiant Ones 
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31. With what singer is the song "Bad, Bad, Leroy Brown" most closely 
associated? 
35 3.5 5/7 = • 71 2/6 = .33 
a. Elton John c. James Brown 
b. Jim Croce d. Neil Diamond 
32. Who was Abraham Lincoln's immediate successor as U.S. president? 
15 3.2 4/13 = .31 6/20 = .30 
a. Andrew Johnson c. James Buchanan 
b. Ulysses S. Grant d. Rutherford B. Hayes 
33. What was the name of the first British settlement in the U.S.? 
19 3.6 7/15 = .47 8/14 - .57 
a. Roanoke c. Massachusetts Bay 
b. Plymouth d. Jamestown 
34. Who wrote "The Rhyme of the Ancient Mariner"? 
1 2.6 3/13 = .23 2/34 = .06 
a. William Wordsworth c. Walter Scott 
b. Samuel Coleridge d. Thomas Gray 
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35. Who was the Chicago mayor immediately before Richard Daley? 
0 2.7 5/16 = .31 3/32 = .09 
a. Anton Cermak c. William Thompson 
b. Daniel Ryan d. Martin Kennelly 
36. Who is famous for the painting "Water Lilies"? 
8 1.8 2/2 = 1.00 23/38 = .61 
a. Pierre-Auguste Renoir c. Claude Monet 
b. Paul Cezanne d. Jean-Auguste Ingres 
37. Who is credited with the discovery of penicdllin? 
4 3.9 13/28 = .46 5/16 = .31 
a. Marie Curie c. Alexander Fleming 
b. August Wassermann d. Louis Pasteur 
38. Who was the first European to. reach India by water? 
4 3.1 7/20 = .35 10/24 = .42 
a. Bartholomeo Diaz c. Vasco da Gama 
b. Ferdinand Magellan d. Prince Henry 
39. Who wrote "Ode on a Grecian Urn"? 
3 2.7 6/15 = .40 12/30 = .40 
a. Percy Bysshe Shelley c. John Keats 
b. Lord Byron d. Alfred Lord Tennyson 
40. Who was the painter of "Blue Boy"? 
1 3.0 5/19 = .26 9/28 = .32 
a. Frederic Remington c. Joshua Reynolds 
b. John Singer Sargent d. Thomas Gainsborough 
41. Whose ghost returns to haunt Macbeth? 
1 3.8 9/27 = .33 5/20 = .25 
a. Macduff c. Duncan 
b. Banquo d. Fleance 
42. "Born to be Wild" was popularized by what musical group? 
17 3.5 8/19 = .42 5/12 = .42 
a. Led Zeppelin c. Guess Who 
b. Steppenwolf d. Rolling Stones 
43. Who founded the Standard Oil Company? 
27 2.4 5/5 = 1.00 10/16 = .62 
a. John D. Rockefeller c. J. Pierpont Morgan 
b. Cornelius Vanderbilt d. Edward Harriman 
44. Who was voted the most valuable baseball player last year in the 
National League? 
5 3.2 3/19 = .16 4/24 = .17 
a. Steve Garvey c. Hank Aaron 
b. Lou Brock d. Johnny Bench 
45. What is the name of the tallest mountain in the continental U.S. 
(excluding Alaska)? 
1 3.6 17/26 = .65 4/21 = .19 
a. Mt. Whitney c. Mt. Evans 
b. Mt. Rainier d. Mt. Shasta 
46. Who sculpted "The Thinker"? 
3 2.6 5/12 = .42 6/33 = .18 
a. Auguste Rodin c. Leonardo da Vinci 
b. Michelangelo Buonarroti d. Gianlorenzo Bernini 
148 
47. Who was Richard Nixon's first Secretary of State? 
1 3.0 3/21 = .14 10/26 = .38 
a. Clark Clifford c. William Rogers 
b. Henry Cabot Lodge d. Dean Rusk 
48. Who wrote Gulliver's Travels? 
9 3.7 21/23 = .91 11/16 = .69 
a. Samuel Johnson c. Jonathan Swift 
b. Charles Lamb d. James Boswell 
49. Who discovered the neutron as a separate entity? 
0 2.5 4/10 = .40 11/38 = .29 
a. John Dalton c. James Maxwell 
b. James Chadwick d. Ernest Rutherford 
50. What is the name of the first full scale battle of the Civil War 
(i.e., not Fort Sumter)? 
5 3.8 7/15 = .47 7/28 = .25 
a. Bull Run c. Gettysburg 
b. Antietam d. Fredericksburg 
51. Who was the only U.S. Vice-President to resign from office before 
S. Agnew? 
1 2.8 5/14 = .36 14/33 = .42 
a. John Calhoun c. James Knox Polk 
b. Daniel Webster d. Henry Clay 
52. What state is called the "Lone Star State"? 
40 3.8 5/5 = 1.00 3/3 = 1.00 
a. California c. Maine 
b. Texas d. Vermont 
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Answers to the general-information questions. 
1. b 14. d 27. a 40. d 
2. b 15. d 28. b 41. b 
3. d 16. a 29. d 42. b 
4. b 17. d 30. b 43. a 
5. a 18. c 31. b 44. a 
'6. c 19. c 32. a 45. a 
7. b 20. d 33. d 46. a 
8. c 21. c 34. b 47. c 
9. d 22. a 35. d 48. c 
10. c 23. a 36. c 49. b 
11. -d. 24. b 37. c 50. a 
12. a 25. d 38. c 51. a 
13. b 26. d 39. c 52. b 
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